2002
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.302606
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The Influence of Managerial Ownership on the Real Gains in Corporate Mergers and Market Revaluation of Merger Partners: Empirical Evidence

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Cited by 25 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Board size has a negative significant coefficient indicating that firms with a smaller board size achieve higher Q values. Research by Carline, Linn and Yadav (2002) also claims that board size is inversely related to operating performance in UK firms. Mak and yuanto (2002) examined the relationship between size of the board and firm performance in Singapore and Malaysia.…”
Section: Board Composition and Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Board size has a negative significant coefficient indicating that firms with a smaller board size achieve higher Q values. Research by Carline, Linn and Yadav (2002) also claims that board size is inversely related to operating performance in UK firms. Mak and yuanto (2002) examined the relationship between size of the board and firm performance in Singapore and Malaysia.…”
Section: Board Composition and Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similar to Healy et al (1992), the median of ACFR 3 years before and after acquisition (ACFRpre and ACFRpost) is used. Furthermore, while most studies focus on post-acquisition performance only (Healy et al, 1992;Linn & Switzer, 2001;Loughran & Ritter, 1997;Powell & Stark, 2005;Rahman & Limmack, 2004), some papers also calculate the change in cash flow returns ( ACFR) to examine the improvement in performance (Carline, Linn, & Yadav, 2002;Rahman & Limmack, 2004). ACFR is defined as ACFRpost minus ACFRpre.…”
Section: Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Synergies may arise in situations where the bidder and target operate in similar industries, a 'focus effect' [43], as in the case of Stelmar and OSG. The hubris and empire building hypothesis predicts that target firm returns should be positive, bidder firm returns should be negative and the combined firm returns should be non-positive; mergers are not wealth-creating events but attempts to build corporate empires serving managerial self-interests.…”
Section: Corporate Takeovers and Shareholder Valuementioning
confidence: 99%