The Institutional Presidency from a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s

Abstract

This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency -meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive -in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system -that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the number and type of presidential agencies.

The Institutional Presidency in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis

“…In addition, we expect that different degrees of party fragmentation in the cabinet will affect the presidency, with coalition presidents building a more complex institution. Changes to the agencies under the presidential umbrella can affect substantive tasks involved in the provision of core administrative, policy, or advisory support (Inácio ; Inácio and Llanos ).…”

“…Recent research on centers of governments in Latin America has highlighted the existence of fluctuations in terms of which structures are in charge of supporting the president in managing the cabinet and other executive actions. Inácio and Llanos () have demonstrated ebbs and flows in the evolution of the institutional presidency in Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s, which have led to a larger institutional presidency in the second case. For Brazil scholars have provided evidence both of centralization of lawmaking activity within the presidency (Gallord and Rennó 2015; Batista ) and of centralized coordination to deal with policy divergence among cabinet members (Inácio ).…”

“…Many of the agencies operating under the presidential umbrella are in charge of the daily tasks of leadership support, but some may also be in charge of implementing policy (and could, in principle, be located in ministerial departments). Councils that provide policy advice could also be in existence (Inácio and Llanos ).…”

Crises, Structures, and Managerial Choice in Economic Policy Making: Presidential Management of Macroeconomic Policy in Argentina and the United States

“…The other potential explanation of presidential management choices for economic policy making is institutional: management structures are a function of the president's institutional power to centralize decision‐making processes. When presidents are constitutionally empowered to decide unilaterally on lawmaking and the appointment of their own cabinet, they are also typically able to politicize cabinet agencies by appointing their preferred staff, and therefore tend to employ hierarchical arrangements in which they decide policy for themselves or delegate authority to trusted officials (Inacio and Llanos ). In contrast, when presidents are constitutionally unable to decide unilaterally on lawmaking and cabinet appointments, they are typically unable to politicize cabinet agencies and must resort to persuasion, for which the use of collegial or competitive management structures may be more appropriate.…”

“…The personality explanation argues that presidents with higher predisposition to learn from their advisers would develop stable advisory systems based upon collegial management structures, whereas presidents with higher predisposition to control the work of their employees would be more inclined to change advisory systems and adopt hierarchical management structures (Preston and ‘t Hart ; Kowert ). The institutional explanation argues that presidents with weak unilateral powers operating in decentralized policy‐making environments would typically build presidential advisory agencies to work alongside or compete with cabinet departments; whereas presidents with strong unilateral powers operating in more centralized policy‐making environments would typically control policy processes by politicizing cabinet agencies or centralizing decisions (Dickinson ; Lewis ; Inacio and Llanos ). The personality explanation would therefore predict as much change in presidential management choices as there are changes in presidents, while the institutional explanation would only predict change in management choices as long as there are changes in the institutional capacity of the presidency.…”