The internal and external centralisation of Capital Markets Union regulatory structures: the case of Central Counterparties

Bulfone, Fabio; Smoleńska, Agnieszka

doi:10.4337/9781839101120.00010

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…EMIR regulates the terms of market access of CCPs, such as the level of capital requirements and the rules of governance (Bulfone and Smolenska, 2020, p. 58f). With supervisory competences delegated to ESMA, these rules led to a certain centralization of substantive requirements and allow for political control.…”

Section: Illustrative Empirical Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, supervising implementation remained with national authorities. This resulted in a variegated institutional structure: some member states are tasking national supervisory authorities, others central banks with implementation while ESMA is only controlling the functional equivalence of their supervisory qualities over CCPs (Bulfone and Smolenska, 2020, p. 59).…”

Section: Illustrative Empirical Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Financial markets regulation: political accountability challenged

Héritier

2023

ITPD

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PurposeThis paper aims to conceptualize and empirically illustrate the challenges that financial market regulation presents to politicians and the organization tasked with specifying regulations and supervising their implementation in the interest of users and consumers of financial instruments. It analyses the problem from the viewpoint of the governor's dilemma and the control/competence conflict, the linked problem of the rent-seeking of agents/intermediators and consumers of financial instruments. Political accountability problems are enhanced by the materiality of the technologies used, i.e. algo trading.Design/methodology/approachThe paper theoretically conceptualizes and empirically illustrates the argument.FindingsThe paper finds that regulators of digitalized financial markets are faced with considerable problems and depend on private agents when regulating financial transactions. However, the new technological instruments also offer new possibilities for securing compliance.Research limitations/implicationsFurther research should focus more in-depth on the cooperation between public and private actors in the specification and implementation of regulatory details. It should further investigate the conditions which allow regulators to use RegTech in the surveillance of financial firms.Practical implicationsSince financial market transactions are opaque for most users, the creation of more transparency is crucial to hold regulators accountable in their activity of surveillance of financial firms. New algorithm-based technologies may lend important support in doing so.Originality/valueBy linking the different analytical perspectives, i.e. the governor's dilemma vis-à-vis the intermediator or agent and the possible rent-seeking of intermediators, under the condition of a highly developed technology of financial transactions as well as the market structure, the paper offers new insights into the limits as well as new opportunities of regulating financial markets allowing for political accountability of regulators and financial firms.

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Section: Illustrative Empirical Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Illustrative Empirical Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial markets regulation: political accountability challenged

Héritier

2023

ITPD

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Private organisations may, for example, perform systemic functions in the financial market and may therefore be required by public institutions to report on their actions. An example is the crucial role that central counterparties (CCPs) play in the post-crisis governance of financial markets, as they are responsible for clearing a large share of financial transactions (Bulfone and Smoleńska 2020). Another form of public-private collaboration is when public authorities structurally seek policy advice from private actors, which consequently have a comparative advantage in being able to advocate their preferred policies (Bouwen 2004).…”

Section: Procedural Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%