The internal economics of the firm: further evidence from personnel data

Treble, John G.; Gameren, Edwin van; Bridges, Sarah; Barmby, Tim

doi:10.1016/s0927-5371(01)00045-8

Cited by 120 publications

(126 citation statements)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

110

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…9 It thus seems that external competition plays a role in the functioning of internal labor markets among the firms in Finnish manufacturing. This finding supports the findings of Baker et al (1994) and Treble et al (2001). This is also in line with the theory of Waldman (1999, 2006) because in their theory, the key aspects of internal labor markets, firm-specific human capital and long-term contracts, are absent.…”

supporting

confidence: 91%

“…Yet, many of the empirical findings by Baker et al (1994) have received support from other case studies, including Seltzer and Merrett (2000), Treble et al (2001) and Dohmen et al (2004), which use data from different institutional environments, time periods and industries. Nevertheless, there are also some important differences in the results between these studies, leaving open the question of which of the results hold true across various settings and which are particular to the specific case studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Career and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Kauhanen¹,

Napari²

2012

Research in Labor Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

supporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Career and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Kauhanen¹,

Napari²

2012

Research in Labor Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…34 Evidence on promotion fast-tracks is also found by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a); Ariga, Ohkusa, and Brunello (1999); Seltzer and Merrett (2000); Treble, Barmby, Bridges, and van Gameren (2001);and Lin (2002).…”

Section: The Longitudinal Relation Between Performance and Earnings Pmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…However, no other study to date has reported evidence about the size of increases in contractually deferred compensation that is associated with a promotion. 32 Several studies -among them Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a), Treble, Barmby, Bridges, and van Gameren (2001), or Lluis (2002) -have documented that wage growth at promotion is higher than without but that it is lower than the average difference in wage growth between adjacent job levels. Obviously, this conclusion is also drawn from the Fokker data since upward job transitions typically involve promotion to a higher salary scale and since higher job levels comprise higher salary scales.…”

Section: The Longitudinal Relation Between Performance and Earnings Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance, seniority, and wages: formal salary systems and individual earnings profiles

Dohmen

2004

Labour Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) welfare state and labor market, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. Medoff andAbraham (1980, 1981) and Flabbi and Ichino (2001) using personnel data from the Dutch national aircraft manufacturer Fokker. It shows how a formal salary system, as is widely used by large firms, brings about that seniority-wage profiles are largely independent of controls for reported performance in cross-sectional wage regressions even though supervisors' evaluations shape life-cycle earnings profiles. Performance ratings determine how fast a worker climbs the firm's career and wage ladder. The paper also reveals that real wage growth depends on the employer's prosperity. Furthermore it demonstrates that formal salary systems cause serial correlation in wage growth and `Green Card' effects. JEL Classification:M52, J30, J31

show abstract

“…For instance, Holmström (1994a, 1994b) as well as Treble et al (2001) use personnel records and examine the white collar workforces of single financial sector firms. They concentrate on fix wages and abstain from dealing with bonuses, though.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels, and Tenure: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

Grund

Kräkel

2012

Schmalenbach Bus Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. Using data on executive compensation for the German chemical industry, we investigate the relevance of two theoretical approaches that focus on bonuses as part of a long term wage policy of a firm. The first approach argues that explicit bonuses serve as substitutes for implicit career concerns. The second approach claims that bonuses are used as complements to an executive's internal career. Our data show that bonus payments are mostly prevalent among senior executives at higher hierarchy levels and rather for management jobs than for jobs in research and development. This is true for the whole chemical sector as well as for single large corporations. The findings indicate that the two theoretical views are not mutually exclusive, but are both relevant in practice. JEL Classification:M52, J33

show abstract

The internal economics of the firm: further evidence from personnel data

Cited by 120 publications

References 5 publications

Career and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Career and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

Performance, seniority, and wages: formal salary systems and individual earnings profiles

Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels, and Tenure: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About