The Jews of Perpignan in the Thirteenth Century. an Economic Study Based on Notarial Records

Emery, Richard W.

doi:10.7312/emer93674

Cited by 16 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…collect and invest the savings of the whole Jewish merchant class (as opposed to the savings of a few rich individuals, which at that time was a far more common banking practice). Europe saw its first Jewish bankers within the administration of the Merovingian Kings in AD 481, and for the five centuries following the rise of the First Crusade, Jews turned chiefly to loan-banking for sustenance (Emery 1959;Roth 1961b;Arkin 1975, 57-63).…”

Section: Jewish Merchants and Private Orderingmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

Richman

2006

The Global Diamond Industry

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This article argues that Jewish merchants have historically dominated the diamond industry because of their ability to reliably implement diamond credit sales. Success in the industry requires enforcing executory agreements that are beyond the reach of public courts, and Jewish diamond merchants enforce such contracts with a reputation mechanism supported by a distinctive set of industry, family, and community institutions. An industry arbitration system publicizes promises that are not kept. Intergenerational legacies induce merchants to deal honestly through their very last transaction, so that their children may inherit valuable livelihoods. And ultra-Orthodox Jews, for whom participation in their communities is paramount, provide important value-added services to the industry without posing the threat of theft and flight.

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Section: Jewish Merchants and Private Orderingmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

Richman

2006

The Global Diamond Industry

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“… See Baron (, p. 135). Emery (); Lipman (); Mundill () and Botticini () provide excellent empirical studies of how medieval Jewish moneylenders operated. For analysis of the tightening of the usury prohibition see Chazan () and Koyama (). …”

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confidence: 99%

“…SeeBaron (1967b, p. 135) Emery (1959)Lipman (1967);Mundill (1991) andBotticini (1997) provide excellent empirical studies of how medieval Jewish moneylenders operated.…”

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confidence: 99%

Jewish Persecutions and Weather Shocks: 1100–1800

Anderson

Johnson

Koyama

2016

The Economic Journal

138

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What factors caused the persecution of minorities in premodern Europe? Using panel data consisting of 1,366 persecutions of Jews from 936 European cities between 1100 and 1800, we test whether persecutions were more likely following colder growing seasons. A one standard deviation decrease in growing season temperature in the previous five-year period increased the probability of a persecution by between 1 and 1.5 percentage points (relative to a baseline of 2 %). This effect was strongest in weak states and with poor quality soil. The long-run decline in persecutions was partly attributable to greater market integration and state capacity.

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“…48 Although it is not possible to estimate to what extent such fictions were exceptions to the norm, there is evidence that similar techniques were used wherever usury laws were in place, across early modern Europe and the Middle East. 49 Similarly, just because a contract states that the loan was 'gratuitous' does not necessarily mean that no interest was charged. 50 The prices given in contracts and accounts were not necessarily what they seemed, and (as will be shown) such fictional elements might also be incorporated into notarial documents.…”

Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 99%

The Informal Economy of Credit in Early Modern Venice

Shaw

2018

Hist. J.

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Evidence from the Piovego, the fraud magistracy of early modern Venice, offers a critical perspective on the documentary record of credit and the ways in which this was used in practice. Although it was formally illegal to charge interest on personal loans, a variety of legal fictions were employed to evade the ban. Such fictions significantly reduced the transparency and certainty of exchange, pushing personal loans into a world of semi-legality. This was a ‘baroque economy’, in which people were aware of the potential discrepancy between surface form and underlying substance, and private agreements might be contested on grounds of substantive fairness. The ‘hidden transcripts’ presented by litigants indicate that the formal record must be interpreted through a ‘thick description’ that considers its role as a resource in a broader process of negotiation. Far from being a ‘market’, characterized by price competition, choice, and transparency, the informal economy of credit was embedded in long-term power relationships. Rather than celebrating intermediaries such as brokers and notaries as facilitators of ‘market’ relations, we need to understand them as part of a hierarchical network of power and wealth, embedded in long-term relationships.

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The Jews of Perpignan in the Thirteenth Century. an Economic Study Based on Notarial Records

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

Jewish Persecutions and Weather Shocks: 1100–1800

The Informal Economy of Credit in Early Modern Venice

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