The Joint‐decision Trap: Lessons From German Federalism and European Integration

Abstract

Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making ('Politikverflechtung') in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de fact0 requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a 'problem-solving' (as opposed to a 'bargaining') style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the 'bargaining' style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory jointdecision systems. This 'jointdecision trap' is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub-optimal policy output, seem to represent 'local optima' when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration. Fritz W. scharpf is Director at the Max-Planck-Jmtitut h Gesellsdtaftsforschung, Cologne. Manuscript completed in 1988. Shorter versions (1986) have appeared under the title 'Die Politikverflechtungsfalle: Europaische Integration und deutscher Foderalismus im Vergleich' in: Politische Vierteljuhresschrift 26: 323-56 (Dezember 1985) and under the title 'La trapolla della decisione congiunta: federalism0 tedesco e integrazione europea' in Stato e Mercato 17: 175-216 (Agosto 1986).

The political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies in Switzerland

“…We are sceptical, however, about the possible success of this endeavour. The cooperation among federal actors, as well as a still subdued role of strategic intelligence in the construction, might make it difficult to use this governance structure to effectively establish more cohesion in policy-making; the demand to find large majorities and the veto-power of the federal government bear the risk of non-decisions or of a policy of the lowest common denominator (Scharpf, 1988). …”

Legitimacy Intermediation in the Multilevel European Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis

“…But when the discrepancy between required behavior and personal interests and preferences increases, and when low-risk opportunities for evasion exist, legitimacy beliefs may become a crucial factor contributing to the voluntary compliance with undesired rules or decisions of governing authority (Easton 1965: 278-319;Kielmansegg 1971;Beetham 1991;Scharpf 1999Scharpf , 2007Höffe 2002: 40). Such beliefs, however, are not primarily a matter of individual consciences.…”

“…Its pragmatic importance in political systems is best clarified from a functional perspective (Scharpf 1999): in exercising their powers, governments must claim resources and constrain actions in ways that will often conflict with the interests and political preferences of their subjects. As a consequence, compliance must be an underlying problem in all political systems.…”

“…Finally, I will also refer to the distinction between input-oriented and output-oriented legitimating arguments (Scharpf 1970(Scharpf , 1999M. G. Schmidt 2008;Ruffing 2011).…”

“…On the output side, the Union's capacity to promote the common good is constrained by the consensus requirements of a multiple-veto system (Scharpf 1988;Falkner 2011). These requirements prevent effective collective action in response to many problems that member states could not deal with nationally.…”