No abstract

Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making ('Politikverflechtung') in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de fact0 requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a 'problem-solving' (as opposed to a 'bargaining') style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the 'bargaining' style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory jointdecision systems. This 'jointdecision trap' is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub-optimal policy output, seem to represent 'local optima' when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration. Fritz W. scharpf is Director at the Max-Planck-Jmtitut h Gesellsdtaftsforschung, Cologne. Manuscript completed in 1988. Shorter versions (1986) have appeared under the title 'Die Politikverflechtungsfalle: Europaische Integration und deutscher Foderalismus im Vergleich' in: Politische Vierteljuhresschrift 26: 323-56 (Dezember 1985) and under the title 'La trapolla della decisione congiunta: federalism0 tedesco e integrazione europea' in Stato e Mercato 17: 175-216 (Agosto 1986).

No abstract

The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and research activities of the Institute in Florence.

No abstract