The Justification of the Denial of the Divorce Thesis

Abstract

The contemporary philosophical understanding of scientific rationality fundamentally distinguishes itself from the conservative positions by what may be considered a categorial reorientation by which it is meant that it replaces the old categories by the new ones in terms of which the essential nature of the structure and dynamics of science are described and explained. In the beginning, the radicalization of the categorial framework has been brought through category transformation, which is very well exemplified in the nullification of the discovery-justification distinction. Apart from this parasitic semantic content, 'discovery' carried a negative meaning in terms of what it is not. With the nullification of the distinction, the semantic content of discovery has become not only autonomous, and positive but also, comprehensive so much as to become the focal concept in grasping the essence of scientific activity. These changes have fundamentally altered the discourse about discovery in ways that can be of momentous significance to science education (Schickore and Steinle, 2006). An attempt is made in this paper to illuminate how the denial of the divorce thesis has been justified by the philosophical arguments of