The Kingmaker:

Political Parties and Violence in Karachi, Pakistan

“…For its part, the Pakistan Army generally tolerated the high levels of violence in Karachi for long stretches either because of its courtship of the MQM or PPP for domestic political management or because the Army believed security forces faced more pressing challenges outside of Karachi, such as separatists or Islamist groups. Indeed, scholars suggest that the MQM was initially supported by the army because it was seen as posing a (desired) challenge to the PPP-which itself had been previously patronized by the army (Siddiqa, 2020). However, when violence in Karachi grew to intolerable levels or when the military had political reasons to crackdown on specific parties, the Army entered the scene.…”

“…Despite this, however, the MQM was able to reemerge in the late 1990s and generally resume its violence strategies; Herald Magazine’s July 1997 issue ran a cover with the words, “Karachi: Return of the Death Squads” and argued that “it seems as if the MQM, which bore the brunt of a long and bloody operation, has learnt few lessons from the past” (Bakhtiar, 1997, p. 31). The MQM was then generally tolerated—some would suggest strengthened—during (fellow Muhajir) General Pervez Musharraf’s dictatorship from 1999 to 2007 (Siddiqa, 2020). Nonetheless, the 1992 operation and its aftermath did leave a considerable impact on MQM party members, with their defense of the party’s continued use of violence tied up strongly with this perception that it was frequently the victim of violence at the hand of the state.…”