The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo

Natali, Denise

doi:10.1080/0163660x.2015.1064715

Cited by 18 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Governance in the Kurdistan Region would not be fully integrated until after the American invasion (Fumerton and Wilgenburg, 2015). Beginning in 2005, the KDP and the PUK signed a strategic deal to govern the Kurdistan Region, which provided the KDP-PUK bloc with a strong, joint majority in the regional parliament and nearly equal distribution of bureaucratic and military posts between KDP and PUK cadres (Natali, 2015). While the agreement ensured some measure of unity between the KDP and PUK, functionally both parties were able to preserve their bureaucratic domination in each of their respective geographic areas of influence (Sagnic, 2016).…”

Section: Puk Establishment Goals and Rivalriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factionalism Within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Hama

2019

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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Institutional conflicts within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have existed ever since the party’s founding in 1975 as a result of a merger of three different factions. The conflicts were successfully managed in a way that did not hurt the party’s overall functioning until the Gorran movement, led by Nawshirwan Mustafa, split off in 2009. However, it was the withdrawal of party leader Jalal Talabani from political and public life due to a stroke suffered in 2012 that most damaged the party’s ability to function, and widened factional cracks within the organization. The absence of Talabani led to the emergence of intense competition between various groups within the PUK for influence and positions. Consequently, PUK policies on a number of important issues in Iraqi Kurdistan have been indecisive and weak since approximately 2013. This research will discuss the PUK’s inconsistent policies and their negative implications for the Kurdistan Region. Furthermore, it will argue that the PUK’s internal conflicts emboldened its rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, between the years 2014 and 2018.

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Section: Puk Establishment Goals and Rivalriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factionalism Within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Hama

2019

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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“…The historical homeland of the Yezidi community in Ninewa was unofficially claimed by the KRG after the fall of the Ba'ath party in 2003, with an official narrative of ethnically Kurdish Yezidi villages falling under their protection. While there is substantial evidence to support Kurdish claims to Sinjar, accusations have been heard of a process of ‘Kurdification’ in a region that did not self‐identify as Kurdish (Natali, ; Smith and Shadarevian, 2017). Yezidi populations have registered threats to their identity from Kurdish assimilation attempts since 2003, especially communities that champion administration of disputed territories by the central government and chose to use Baghdad administered services (Barber, 2017).…”

Section: Kri Idp Education Provisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics ofIDPEducation Provision: Negotiating identity and schooling in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Shanks

2019

International Migration

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The expansion of Islamic State control in Iraq led to massive internal displacement. Iraq now has one of the largest internally displaced populations in the world. Many families found relative safety in government‐controlled towns throughout the country; a large proportion sought refuge in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), having fled from its northern territories where Arabs, Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians and Turkmen each claimed demographic dominance. Consequently, the KRI has become a sanctuary to almost a million Iraqi IDPs of varying ethnic backgrounds and cultures. This article draws on extensive regional fieldwork to explore the relationship between education provision for displaced populations and broader ethno‐sectarian and socio‐political influences. The article will unpack the research question: “In what ways does education for IDPs in KRI exacerbate or mitigate conflict?” and will highlight key areas in which misunderstanding of identity politics has resulted in reduced quality education for displaced populations.

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“…As Natali (2015) argues, an autonomous KRG was a by-product of failed Iraqi state-building policies and it has gradually evolved into a quasi-state. In post-Saddam Iraq, the KRI has advanced in many areas including economically and politically.…”

Section: The Kurds and De Facto Statehoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is only sustainable when oil sells for over US$100 a barrel, which is something that is unlikely to be achieved again, at least for some time. Additionally, the KRG has amassed substantial debts – estimated to be between US$19 billion (O’Driscoll, 2016) and US$22 billion (Natali, 2015: 153). In response to the oil price drop and the resultant crisis, the KRG significantly reduced salaries and also missed several months’ payments altogether.…”

Section: Intricacies Of State-building In the Kri: Economy Internal mentioning

confidence: 99%

Referendums as a political party gamble: A critical analysis of the Kurdish referendum for independence

O’Driscoll

Başer

2019

International Political Science Review

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This article brings the case of the Kurdish referendum for independence into the wider literature on independence referendums. It examines the decision to hold an independence referendum and explores the pre-referendum conditions and the post-referendum consequences. The article argues that the referendum in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was held due to internal political competition and party politics rather than the ripeness of the timing for independence. Theoretically, this article adds a new dimension to the scholarship on independence referendums, as it demonstrates that the purposes of independence referendums can go beyond the question put to the population – such as consolidating popular support by connecting to the population’s nationalist desires, despite independence not being a realistic prospect. Finally, it brings further support for previous findings of the importance of international support for independence referendums.

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The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo

Cited by 18 publications

References 0 publications

Factionalism Within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Factionalism Within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

The Politics ofIDPEducation Provision: Negotiating identity and schooling in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Referendums as a political party gamble: A critical analysis of the Kurdish referendum for independence

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