The last period problem in politics: Do congressional representatives not subject to a reelection constraint alter their voting behavior?

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

“…Although other studies claim to find some evidence that legislators do alter their voting behavior in their last term, they still argue that sorting takes place (Carey, 1994, Zupan, 1990. Besides, the evidence provided by Zupan (1990) for legislators' altering behavior in the last term is strongly criticized by Van Beek (1991).…”

Legislator voting and shirking: A critical review of the literature

“…However, even when the effects are consistent with the ideological consumption argument, the economic importance of these variables is very smalloften implying changes in voting behavior of one percentage point or less. Using this residual approach, Zupan (1990) provides a comparative analysis of changes in the absolute value of ADA residuals between 1977 and 1978 for retiring and non-retiring members of the House of Representatives. Evidence from one of his specifications provides evidence of last period shirking.…”

“…Evidence from one of his specifications provides evidence of last period shirking. 2° Van Beek (1991) also uses the residual approach for the same set of congressmen and for the same time period as Zupan (1990), but he greatly expands this analysis of the last-period problem. He examines the effect of the timing of the retirement decision on changes in four separate ideology scores (ADA, ACA, LCV, NTU).…”

Mr. Smith and the economy: the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting

“…In addition, looser electoral constraints (e.g., lower frequency of reelection bids) may promote greater shirking (Lott 1987;Dougan and Munger 1989), which in the context of our study would mean less responsiveness to economic conditions. Finally, voting data in the Senate typically introduce more noise in empirical estimates than do voting data in the House (Zupan 1990). …”