The legality of the European Central Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme

Mooij, Annelieke A.M.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3677152

Cited by 1 publication

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“…While the European Investment Bank (EIB) (2020a) developed a special COVID‐19 investment scheme of €40bn to support small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), the ECB (2020a) launched a new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), in which it committed to buy public bonds and commercial papers in the financial markets up to €750bn, which then subsequently almost doubled in size to €1350bn (ECB, 2020b). The PEPP presented features similar to the PSPP, but also differed from it in allowing the ECB to buy government bonds without having to adhere to the member states' capital key allocation, so as to maximize its impact in supporting those Euro Area Member States most affected by the pandemic and its consequences (Mooij, 2020). The launch of the PEPP confirmed the continuing centrality of the ECB in the EMU system of governance, notwithstanding the growing legal challenges that the ECB has faced, particularly by Germany's Constitutional Court: the Bundesverfassungsgericht ( BVerfG ) (Baroncelli, 2019).…”

Section: Early Responses To Covid‐19mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legal Architecture of the Economic Responses to COVID‐19: EMU beyond the Pandemic*

Fabbrini

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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This article analyses from a law and policy perspectives the measures adopted by the European Union (EU) to address the devastating economic effects of COVID‐19, assessing their implications for Europe's economic and monetary union (EMU). The article first sets the background by exploring the main features of EMU before COVID‐19. Subsequently, it examines the multiplicity of policies deployed by the EU institutions to contain the socio‐economic damages of the pandemic – including, most crucially, the EU recovery fund "Next Generation EU" – and underlines their transformative effect on the EU architecture of economic governance. As the article argues, the responses to COVID‐19 have produced a significant rebalancing of EMU, bridging the asymmetry between EU monetary and economic policy. Finally, the article considers whether the COVID‐19‐related responses are likely to be only temporary, or rather a new normal for EMU, and sheds light on further constitutional adaptations which are needed to sustain this unprecedented transfer of fiscal power to the EU level.

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Section: Early Responses To Covid‐19mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Legal Architecture of the Economic Responses to COVID‐19: EMU beyond the Pandemic*

Fabbrini

2021

J of Common Market Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The legality of the European Central Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

The Legal Architecture of the Economic Responses to COVID‐19: EMU beyond the Pandemic*

The Legal Architecture of the Economic Responses to COVID‐19: EMU beyond the Pandemic*

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