1993
DOI: 10.2307/2203616
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council

Abstract: The ideal, Once it is embodied in an institution; ceases to be an ideal and becomes the expression of a selfish interest, which must be destroyed in the name of a new ideal. This constant interaction of irreconcilable forces is the stuff of politics. Every political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, of morality and power.

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
19
0
3

Year Published

1995
1995
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
5
4

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 168 publications
(22 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
19
0
3
Order By: Relevance
“…actions is widely debated+ Hence, it is unlikely that the institution has the ability to appear depoliticized, an argument that motivates most constructivist accounts of institutional legitimacy in the international arena+ 5 On the other hand, scholars who study the strategic aspects of international politics have largely dismissed the UN from their analyses+ 6 This article provides a firmer base for the role of the SC in strategic interactions+ I argue that when governments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention; rather, they want political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures+ The rationale is based on an analysis of the strategic dilemmas that impede cooperation in a unipolar world+ In the absence of credible limits to power, fears of exploitation stifle cooperation+ Because no single state can credibly check the superpower, enforcing limits on the superpower's behavior involves overcoming a complex coordination dilemma+ A cooperative equilibrium that implies self-enforcing limits to the exercise of power exists but is unlikely to emerge spontaneously given that governments have conflicting per-2+ See Barnett 1997;Caron 1993;and Hurd 1999and 2002+ 3+ Claude 1966, 373+ 4+ Franck 1990, 42+ 5+ See especially Barnett andFinnemore 1999+ 6+ Hoffmann 1998, 179+ ceptions about what constitute legitimate actions and fundamental transgressions by the superpower+ The SC provides a focal solution that has the characteristics of an elite pact: an agreement among a select set of actors that seeks to neutralize threats to stability by institutionalizing nonmajoritarian mechanisms for conflict resolution+ The elite pact's authority depends on the operation of a social norm in which SC approval provides a green light for states to cooperate, whereas its absence triggers a coordinated response that imposes costs on violators+ The observance of this norm allows for more cooperation and restraint than can be achieved in the absence of coordination on the SC as the proper institutional device+ Hence the extent to which the SC confers legitimacy on uses of force depends not on the perceived normative qualities of the institution, but on the extent to which actors in international politics believe that norm compliance produces favorable outcomes+…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…actions is widely debated+ Hence, it is unlikely that the institution has the ability to appear depoliticized, an argument that motivates most constructivist accounts of institutional legitimacy in the international arena+ 5 On the other hand, scholars who study the strategic aspects of international politics have largely dismissed the UN from their analyses+ 6 This article provides a firmer base for the role of the SC in strategic interactions+ I argue that when governments and citizens look for an authority to legitimize the use of force, they generally do not seek an independent judgment on the appropriateness of an intervention; rather, they want political reassurance about the consequences of proposed military adventures+ The rationale is based on an analysis of the strategic dilemmas that impede cooperation in a unipolar world+ In the absence of credible limits to power, fears of exploitation stifle cooperation+ Because no single state can credibly check the superpower, enforcing limits on the superpower's behavior involves overcoming a complex coordination dilemma+ A cooperative equilibrium that implies self-enforcing limits to the exercise of power exists but is unlikely to emerge spontaneously given that governments have conflicting per-2+ See Barnett 1997;Caron 1993;and Hurd 1999and 2002+ 3+ Claude 1966, 373+ 4+ Franck 1990, 42+ 5+ See especially Barnett andFinnemore 1999+ 6+ Hoffmann 1998, 179+ ceptions about what constitute legitimate actions and fundamental transgressions by the superpower+ The SC provides a focal solution that has the characteristics of an elite pact: an agreement among a select set of actors that seeks to neutralize threats to stability by institutionalizing nonmajoritarian mechanisms for conflict resolution+ The elite pact's authority depends on the operation of a social norm in which SC approval provides a green light for states to cooperate, whereas its absence triggers a coordinated response that imposes costs on violators+ The observance of this norm allows for more cooperation and restraint than can be achieved in the absence of coordination on the SC as the proper institutional device+ Hence the extent to which the SC confers legitimacy on uses of force depends not on the perceived normative qualities of the institution, but on the extent to which actors in international politics believe that norm compliance produces favorable outcomes+…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mechanisms of public power regulation can also be used as a means to enhance governmental legitimacy, by helping to ensure that public authorities are responsive to, and capable of being held accountable by, the main stakeholders in the governance process, the governed community. 4 While there is a range of different views on what constitutes 'legitimate power' or 'legitimate authority' (see, e.g., Caron, 1993;Franck, 1995;Kjaer, 2004, pp. 12 -15;Roth, 2000;Tucker & Hendrickson, 2004, p. 18), the concept is used here in a general sense to refer to power that is 'justified' (Bodansky, 1999, p. 601).…”
Section: Promoting Effectiveness and Legitimacy Through Complex Publimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nem titok, hogy az ENSZ-ben alapítása óta egyenlőtlen hatalmi viszonyok uralkodnak: A legtöbb -és a legszélesebb körben elismert -kritikára a Biztonsági Tanács (BT) összetétele és döntéshozatali mechanizmusa szolgáltat okot (ld. Caron 1993, Kirsch 2005, Hurd 2007, Roberts-Zaum 2008. A jelen tanulmányban problematizált jelenség nem közvetlenül ezzel a kérdéskörrel foglalkozik, tárgya azonban nem függetleníthető tőle.…”
unclassified