The limits of laws: Traffic law enforcement in South Africa

Abstract

Background: The aim of many public policies is to change behaviour. Governments tend to rely on regulations, taxes and subsidies to effect such change. These measures, which affect agents' economic incentives, have a mixed record. A key insight of the New Institutional Economics is that the efficacy of such formal institutions depends on the strength of their enforcement and the extent to which they are compatible with prevailing informal institutions.Aim: This article uses the road safety situation in South Africa as a case study to explore aspects of the relationships among formal institutions, law enforcement and informal institutions.Setting: South Africa has a strong suite of road safety laws but poor road safety outcomes. Methods:The article draws on ideas about the relationships between formal institutions, law enforcement and informal institutions to undertake a case study of the road safety situation in South Africa. Results:The article argues that improved law enforcement cannot fully solve the problem; complementary changes to the informal institutions shaping the behaviour of road users are essential. Conclusion:Institutional economists have to take a greater interest in the insights of research in behavioural economics, behavioural and cognitive science and other disciplines in order to provide useful advice in settings where such change is an important policy objective.

Safer spaces: The impact of a reduction in road fatalities on the life expectancy of South Africans

“…This suggests that RTI costs are equal to 3.4% of South Africa's gross domestic product (GDP). This is one of the highest estimates when compared to other country studies (Du Plessis et al 2020;Wijnen et al 2019). (Symons et al 2019) focus on reducing RTIs for young people and conduct a benefit-cost analysis of a policy package (increased seat belt and helmet usage as well as improved enforcement of alcohol rules and speed restrictions).…”

“…Experimental evidence suggests that payment rates could be improved when motorists are offered the option of a discount on timely payment (Du Plessis et al 2019a). However, better enforcement may not fully solve problems of compliance, since this is not only influenced by the risk of detection and the monetary and legal consequences, but also by social norms (Du Plessis et al 2020).…”

Better Enforcement Is Essential, but May Be Inadequate: Findings of a Survey on the Factors Affecting Payment of Speeding Fines in Cape Town, South Africa

“…These caused 13,591 deaths, 62,520 serious injuries and 202,509 slight injuries, and cost an estimated 3.4% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) [32]. International comparisons show that the road traffic death rate as well as the total cost of road accidents are high in South Africa [33].…”

“…The South African traffic authorities are well aware of the high incidence and damaging effects of speeding on the country's roads, and intensively use visible monitoring as well as fixed and mobile speed cameras to deter and detect transgressions of speed limits (see, for example, Reference [33]). A large number of speeding fines are issued every year, and the authorities employ various media to notify drivers and remind them to pay their fines.…”

“…The system functions poorly, however: the authorities have acknowledged that fewer than 20% of all cases related to transgressions of traffic regulations are finalised with the fines paid [34]. Most transgressors routinely ignore speeding fines (even when summonsed to appear in court for doing so) without suffering any adverse consequences [33]. As was mentioned in Section 1, this reality badly undermines the authorities' efforts to reduce the incidence of speeding.…”