The Logic of Private and Collective Action

Abstract

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation.

The determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU: A multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying

“…Despite the theoretical appeal, the Olsonian argument has hitherto received little empirical support (Lowery and Gray, 2004;Hansen et al, 2005;Ozer and Lee, 2009). Hansen et al (2005) review several well known studies which attempt to establish a correlation between industry concentration and firm political activity.…”

“…Hansen et al (2005) review several well known studies which attempt to establish a correlation between industry concentration and firm political activity. That none of them has found any form of relevant correlation speaks volumes.…”

“…This paper proposes a more sophisticated operationalisation of corporate lobbying. Hansen et al (2005) criticise the normal dichotomous conception of corporate lobbying. Close in spirit to the study of electoral politics, they argue in favour of the categorisation of political behaviours.…”

“…Close in spirit to the study of electoral politics, they argue in favour of the categorisation of political behaviours. In fact, just as electoral behaviour studies differentiate across a wide spectrum of types of participation, Hansen et al (2005) advocate an ordering of the different strategies employed by firms. As a result, they create an ordered categorisation of corporate participation to test the validity of the Olsonian argument in a more reliable manner.…”

“…in lobbying dynamics within determined manufacture industries, Godwin and Seldon, 2002) and then into broader approaches (e.g. Hansen et al, 2005;Lowery et al, 2008;Ozer and Lee, 2009;Godwin et al, 2008). In fact, ceteris paribus (i.e.…”