No abstract

The continuing high prevalence of cigarette smoking among specific subpopulations, many of them vulnerable, is one of the most pressing challenges facing the tobacco control community. These populations include individuals in lower education and/or socioeconomic groups; from certain racial/ethnic groups; in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community; with mental illness; and in the military, particularly among those in the lowest pay grades. Although traditional tobacco control measures are having positive health effects for most groups, the effects are not sufficient for others. More attention to and support for promising novel interventions, in addition to new attempts at reaching these populations through conventional interventions that have proven to be effective, are crucial going forward to find new ways to address these disparities. CA Cancer J Clin 2018;68:106-115. © 2018 American Cancer Society.

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation.

Objective:To describe how the tobacco industry developed a network of consultants to promote ventilation as a “solution” to secondhand smoke (SHS) in the USA.Methods:Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents.Results:As with its other strategies to undermine the passage of clean indoor legislation and regulations, the tobacco industry used consultants who represented themselves as independent but who were promoting the industry’s ventilation “solution” strategies under close, but generally undisclosed, industry supervision. The nature of the industry’s use of ventilation consultants evolved over time. In the 1980s, the industry used them in an effort to steer the concerns about indoor air quality away from secondhand smoke, saying SHS was an insignificant component of a much larger problem of indoor air quality and inadequate ventilation. By the 1990s, the industry and its consultants were maintaining that adequate ventilation could easily accommodate “moderate smoking”. The consultants carried the ventilation message to businesses, particularly the hospitality business, and to local and national and international regulatory and legislative bodies.Conclusion:While the tobacco industry and its consultants have gone to considerable lengths to promote the tobacco industry’s ventilation “solution”, this strategy has had limited success in the USA, probably because, in the end, it is simpler, cheaper, and healthier to end smoking. Tobacco control advocates need to continue to educate policymakers about this fact, particularly in regions where this strategy has been more effective.