The “losers of automation”: A reservoir of votes for the radical right?

Abstract

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still “just about managing” economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as “coping on present income” are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties.

Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?

“…Right-populist parties often directly appeal to status concerns, while mainstream left parties, dependent on a middle-class base (Gingrich and Hausermann, 2015), have reduced explicit class-based appeals (e.g., Evans and Tilley, 2017). Im et al (2018) show that those in occupations hard hit by technological change are more likely to support right populists. Automation then, simultaneously threatens the material well-being and social status of exposed workers, the former mechanism pushing voters to the mainstream left parties, while the latter pushes them to the populist right.…”

Jobs at risk? Task routineness, offshorability, and attitudes toward immigration

“…Existing studies show that economic vulnerability impacts political preferences (Rehm, 2009;Rovny and Rovny, 2017;Thewissen and Rueda, 2019;Im et al, 2019). We follow these studies and conceptualize economic vulnerability as the risk of becoming unemployed (Rehm, 2009;Schwander and Häusermann, 2013;Im et al, 2019). Unemployment risks vary greatly by occupational characteristics.…”

“…Economically vulnerable workers are a substantial part of radical right parties' electorates (Kriesi et al, 2008;Mayer, 2015). To appeal to such workers, they frequently refer to a nostalgic 'better' past prior to economic and societal upheavals (Gidron and Hall, 2017;Gest et al, 2018;Im et al, 2019). Their discourse frequently blames processes such as international trade, European enlargement, and immigration for the 'worse' present (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016;Owen and Johnston, 2017;Colantone and Stanig, 2018;Goerres et al, 2018).…”

Still blurry? Economic salience, position and voting for radical right parties in Western Europe

“…In the context of post‐industrial economic development, and in the aftermath of the ‘great recession’, radical right parties have attempted to provide a political home to those threatened by various social risks (Rovny & Rovny , Im et al. ). On the other hand, radical right parties remain very conscious of the heterogenous economic interests of their (potential) voters that include (ex‐)industrial workers, lower grade white‐collar workers, as well as small business owners.…”