“…141 It was, as Ernest May argues, both an expression of continental hegemony, and a clear rejection of ideological empire, a sign that the United States would limit its expansion within the boundaries of Britain's Atlantic order. 142 rhetorical coercion: silencing calls for confrontation Not everyone believed the United States could be bound by legitimate principles. Both in Britain and in other European countries, there were those that believed the United States was a rapacious, revisionist power, one that could not be appeased but must be confronted, even at the risk of war.…”
Section: Signaling Restraint and Constraintmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The pretext will be the same: German nationality." 142 Public opinion in France during the crisis, moreover, was stridently pro-Denmark. And in terms of power, each of the European states-Prussia and Austria included-believed that France might be the only state who could unilaterally confront against Prussia's expansion.…”
Section: France and The Search For Revolution In Schleswig-holsteinmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, in May 1935, leaders within the Foreign Office engaged in what only can be called a "content analysis" of Hitler 's rhetoric surrounding rearmament. 142 Hitler's rhetoric, Foreign Office officials like Wigram claimed, was empty and demonstrated only "the extremely clever manner in which Herr Hitler-basing himself on the methods of his master, Bismarck, has been able without falsification but simply by omissions and corrections to alter the tone of the Fourteen Points and the treaty on the rights and wrongs of the discussion of disarmament." 143 But Wigram and others also realized, whatever the truth of Hitler's statements, they created a problem for antiappeasers: "But the fact remains that this long passage in Herr Hitler's is an able take which .…”
Section: Rhetorical Coercion: From Rhetorical Traps To Mobilizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet the rhetoric continued to signal that was not a revolutionary state and would play by the approved rules of the Washington treaties. 142 As John Gittings argues, "Japan was allowed to go so far because the Western powers believed it would keep its imperialist appetite (which they shared) within bounds." 143 Japan, another scholar argues, "had been admitted to the same club as the Western powers and was to be permitted to play the imperialist game by the same rules, so long as open clashes with the treaties were avoided."…”
“…141 It was, as Ernest May argues, both an expression of continental hegemony, and a clear rejection of ideological empire, a sign that the United States would limit its expansion within the boundaries of Britain's Atlantic order. 142 rhetorical coercion: silencing calls for confrontation Not everyone believed the United States could be bound by legitimate principles. Both in Britain and in other European countries, there were those that believed the United States was a rapacious, revisionist power, one that could not be appeased but must be confronted, even at the risk of war.…”
Section: Signaling Restraint and Constraintmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The pretext will be the same: German nationality." 142 Public opinion in France during the crisis, moreover, was stridently pro-Denmark. And in terms of power, each of the European states-Prussia and Austria included-believed that France might be the only state who could unilaterally confront against Prussia's expansion.…”
Section: France and The Search For Revolution In Schleswig-holsteinmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, in May 1935, leaders within the Foreign Office engaged in what only can be called a "content analysis" of Hitler 's rhetoric surrounding rearmament. 142 Hitler's rhetoric, Foreign Office officials like Wigram claimed, was empty and demonstrated only "the extremely clever manner in which Herr Hitler-basing himself on the methods of his master, Bismarck, has been able without falsification but simply by omissions and corrections to alter the tone of the Fourteen Points and the treaty on the rights and wrongs of the discussion of disarmament." 143 But Wigram and others also realized, whatever the truth of Hitler's statements, they created a problem for antiappeasers: "But the fact remains that this long passage in Herr Hitler's is an able take which .…”
Section: Rhetorical Coercion: From Rhetorical Traps To Mobilizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet the rhetoric continued to signal that was not a revolutionary state and would play by the approved rules of the Washington treaties. 142 As John Gittings argues, "Japan was allowed to go so far because the Western powers believed it would keep its imperialist appetite (which they shared) within bounds." 143 Japan, another scholar argues, "had been admitted to the same club as the Western powers and was to be permitted to play the imperialist game by the same rules, so long as open clashes with the treaties were avoided."…”
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