The Many (Yet Few) Faces of Deflationism

Wyatt, Jeremy

doi:10.1093/pq/pqv085

Cited by 46 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…There is a new sense that the debate over deflationism about truth might well be adjudicated best by evaluating what deflationists say about the property of being true. Wyatt's (2015) paper, "The Many (Yet Few) Faces of Deflationism," catalogs five deflationary theses about the property of being true: (Transparency) Being true is a metaphysically transparent property, (Non-explanatory) Being true is a non-explanatory property, These need not be accepted by every deflationist, but each has considerable support. A few clarificatory comments on these deflationary theses are in order.…”

Section: Are Any Aletheic Properties Substantive?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

Scharp

2020

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What is the property of being true like? To answer this question, begin with a Canberra-plan analysis of the concept of truth. That is, assemble the platitudes for the concept of truth, and then investigate which property might satisfy them. This project is aided by Friedman and Sheard's groundbreaking analysis of twelve logical platitudes for truth. It turns out that, because of the paradoxes like the liar, the platitudes for the concept of truth are inconsistent. Moreover, there are so many distinct paradoxes that only small subsets of platitudes for truth are consistent. The result is that there is no property of being true. The failure of the Canberra plan analysis of the concept of truth, points the way toward a new methodology: a conceptual engineering project for the concept of truth. Conceptual engineering is assessing the quality of our concepts, and when they are found defective, offering new and better concepts to replace them for certain purposes. Still, there are many aletheic properties, which are properties satisfied by reasonably large subsets of platitudes for the concept of truth. We can treat these aletheic properties as a guide to the multitude of new aletheic concepts, which are concepts similar to, but distinct from, the concept of truth. Any new aletheic concept or team of concepts might be called on to replace the concept of truth. In particular, the concepts of ascending truth and descending truth are recommended, but the most important point is that we need a full-scale investigation into the space of aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts-that is, we need an Aletheic Principles Project (APP).

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Section: Are Any Aletheic Properties Substantive?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering for truth: aletheic properties and new aletheic concepts

Scharp

2020

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“…Strawson in maintaining that being true doesn't exist. That being said, Scharp goes on to argue, by drawing on a framework that I develop in Wyatt (2016), that there are significant respects in which the various aletheic properties are substantive. This means that while Scharp can happily join the ranks of prominent deflationists about being true, he rejects an across-the-board deflationism about the aletheic properties.…”

Section: Scharpmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Boghossian (1990: n. 17).9 For more subtle treatments of these issues, seeAsay (2013),Edwards (2018, ch. 2), Eklund (this issue), Scharp (this issue), andWyatt (2016Wyatt ( , 2020.…”

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confidence: 99%

Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’

Wyatt

2020

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The papers in this special issue investigate a range of topics that pertain to the distinction between the concept and the property of truth. The distinction between property concepts and the properties that they pick out is a mainstay within analytic philosophy. We have learned to distinguish, for instance, between our ordinary concept simultaneous and the property simultaneity that it picks out. 1 The significance of this distinction is borne out in the theories of reference that were developed, for instance, by Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980), andLewis (1984). If we apply any of these theories to simultaneous, they will generate the result that this concept refers to the relativized property simultaneity, even if many users of the concept take simultaneity to be absolute. The concept-property distinction in truth theory: Alston's constraintUndoubtedly, then, it is important to draw the general distinction between property concepts and properties themselves. What, though, is this meant to show us about truth? Arguably, the locus classicus for thought on this topic is the work of William Alston, who observes of the concept-property distinction that "discussions of truth are led seriously astray by neglecting it." 2 Alston brings out the relevance of the distinction to theories of truth as follows 3 :

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“…But the topic of the previous section concerned what the exhaustion claim comes to in the case of properties and the conclusions were negative. Wyatt (2016) discusses what claims about the metaphysics of the property of being true those deflationists who take truth to be a property are committed to, and he suggests that there are two such claims. First, (Unconstituted) There is a property truth, but it is insusceptible to an opaque constitution theory.…”

Section: Transparencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 As for "genuine", "substantive" etc., these are somewhat unclear bits of jargon. Some authors-for example Damnjanovic (2010), Edwards (2013) and Wyatt (2016)-have recently done more than has previously been done to elucidate what these pieces of jargon mean. I will later in the discussion have occasion to bring up some suggestions they make.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%