The metaphysics of social kinds

Mason, Rebecca

doi:10.1111/phc3.12381

Cited by 31 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…As we said above, there are several authors who contrast natural kinds with other types or kinds, such as human or interact ive kinds (Hacking, 1991b(Hacking, , 1995, human-made kinds (Ereshefsky, 2004), normative kinds (Griffiths, 2004), historical kinds (Bach, 2012), objective types (Haslanger, 2012), pract ical kinds (Zachar, 2000), or social kinds (Mason, 2016), to mark the difference between the sciences concerned with human behavior and the natural sciences. In this paper we propose to use the category of "normative kind" to include all those categories that involve normative standards behind their stereotypical features.…”

Section: Natural Kinds and Normative Kindsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When it comes to social sciences and humanistic disciplines, the idea of natural kind seems inappropriate. Many authors contrast natural kinds with other types of categories, such as human or interact ive kinds (Hacking, 1991b(Hacking, , 1995, human-made kinds (Ereshefsky, 2004), normative kinds (Griffiths, 2004), pract ical kinds (Zachar, 2000), historical kinds (Bach, 2012), objective types (Haslanger, 2012) or social kinds (Mason, 2016), in order to mark a difference between the taxonomies used in natural sciences and other kinds of categorization pract ices.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Pérez

Ciccia²

2019

Filosofia Unisinos

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The main thesis of this paper is that a large part of human behavior cannot be understood in terms of natural kinds but by appealing to normative kinds. In the first section we explain the distinction between natural kinds and normative kinds. In the second section we focus on the notion of "human behavior", proposing a distinction between type A and type B behaviors and pointing out that psychology deals with type B behaviors, which are also included as diagnostic criteria for mental disorders. In the third section we analyze the strategies used in biomedical research to find specific etiologies ("essences") in order to explain such disorders. We argue that their results are inconsistent and that the lack of biomarkers that are clinically useful to refine the diagnoses is due to the fact that, unlike certain neuropathologies, there are no physiological essences behind such disorders. On the other hand, we argue that, as we are dealing with type B behaviors, we must interpret mental disorders as normative kinds.

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Section: Natural Kinds and Normative Kindsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Pérez

Ciccia²

2019

Filosofia Unisinos

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“…Gender structures could not be defined and would not exist without social factors. On the view 27 See Mason (2016) for arguments that some social kinds are more natural than others. Khalidi (2013Khalidi ( , 2015a argues that some social kinds are natural.…”

Section: Feature Social Groups and The Goldilocks Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Mason () for arguments that some social kinds are more natural than others. Khalidi (, ) argues that some social kinds are natural.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups

Ritchie

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Social groups—like teams, committees, gender groups, and racial groups—play a central role in our lives and in philosophical inquiry. Here I develop and motivate a structuralist ontology of social groups centered on social structures (i.e., networks of relations that are constitutively dependent on social factors). The view delivers a picture that encompasses a diverse range of social groups, while maintaining important metaphysical and normative distinctions between groups of different kinds. It also meets the constraint that not every arbitrary collection of people is a social group. In addition, the framework provides resources for developing a broader structuralist view in social ontology.

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“…I contrast "social" with "natural" kinds solely on etiology (if these categories emerge in ordinary social contexts) and practical relevance for social cognition. On the issue of the ontological objectivity of social kinds, the degree by which they are "socially constructed" via arbitrary human decision-making or if there are facts of the matter independent of human intention, I will have something to say in the next subsection over at Postulate 12 (for lively contemporary discussions on this matter, see [70,71]). …”

Section: Modeling Social Kinds and Human Societiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

Doria¹

2017

Philosophies

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I submit that epistemic progress in key areas of contemporary academic philosophy has been compromised by politically correct ("PC") ideology. First, guided by an evolutionary account of ideology, results from social and cognitive psychology and formal philosophical methods, I expose evidence for political bias in contemporary Western academia and sketch a formalization for the contents of beliefs from the PC worldview taken to be of core importance, the theory of social oppression and the thesis of anthropological mental egalitarianism. Then, aided by discussions from contemporary epistemology on epistemic values, I model the problem of epistemic appraisal using the frameworks of multi-objective optimization theory and multi-criteria decision analysis and apply it to politically correct philosophy. I conclude that philosophy guided by politically correct values is bound to produce constructs that are less truth-conducive and that spurious values which are ideologically motivated should be abandoned. Objections to my framework stemming from contextual empiricism, the feminine voice in ethics and political philosophy are considered. I conclude by prescribing the epistemic value of empirical adequacy, the contextual value of political diversity and the moral virtue of moral courage to reverse unwarranted trends in academic philosophy due to PC ideology.

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The metaphysics of social kinds

Cited by 31 publications

References 52 publications

Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Natural kinds, normative kinds and human behavior

Social Structures and the Ontology of Social Groups

The Unreasonable Destructiveness of Political Correctness in Philosophy

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