The Mexican State and the Political Implications of Economic Restructuring

Teichman, Judith

doi:10.1177/0094582x9201900205

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In this threatening situation, the PRI strengthened its bonds with the business elite through its Commission for Financing and Consolidation of Resources. The Commission raised funds for Salinas' election campaign and encouraged the owners of large companies (including the newly privatized firms) to contribute millions of dollars (Teichman, ; Valdés Ugalde, ). Such massive financial support by the private sector was previously unknown in Mexico, but it set a trend for the years to come.…”

Section: Continuing Practices and New Concerns About Pso Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The changing politics of lobbying: private sector organizations in Mexico

Hogenboom¹

2013

Journal of Public Affairs

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This article analyzes how the relations between Mexico's private sector, particularly that of business power groups and interest groups, and the political elite changed as a result of processes of neo-liberalization and democratization from the early 1980s through the presidency of Vicente Fox (2000Fox ( -2006. The analysis provides several insights into Mexico's developing interest group system during these years and particularly that of business interests. On the one hand, the changes increased political pluralism, the number of groups operating, and their lobbying options and helped move Mexico toward liberal democracy. On the other hand, with its major resources and political connections, big business was able to maintain, in fact enhance, its political status, whereas small business was less politically successful. Moreover, many old political practices used by big business to influence government persist as well as skepticism among the public regarding democratic institutions. As a consequence, this article argues that despite the new developments in political advocacy, the continuation of traditional political practices presents obstacles to the development of interest group activity resulting in a plutocratic element to Mexico's emerging democracy.

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Section: Continuing Practices and New Concerns About Pso Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The changing politics of lobbying: private sector organizations in Mexico

Hogenboom¹

2013

Journal of Public Affairs

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“…As such, the PRI (Partido de Revolución Instituciónal) "lost ground as a legitimator of the regime" (Dresser 1994:126). Thus, many traditional PRI supporters were alienated, the governing coalition was split and opposition parties gained a stronger foothold with the Mexican constituency (see Craig and Cornelius, 1995; see also Teichman, 1992, andLaBotz, 1995, chapter 7).…”

Section: Salinas's Technocratic Revolutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

For Whom the Nation? Internationalization, Zapatismo, and the Struggle Over Mexican Modernity

Hilbert

1997

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Recent literature on interactions arising between capital forces and local communities has tended to equate “the global” with economic globalization and “the local” as a more or less reactive formation. Less attention is paid to the fact that processes very particular to a locale are crucial mediators between global and local scales. Perhaps the most salient of these is the production of national ideology. This paper examines Mexico in the 1990s and explores the way leaders wove articulations of modernity through reproductions of nationalism to exclude those—poor, largely rural and indigenous—who didn't fit the picture of progress, then looks at how several indigenous communities contested these elite notions, demanding equal access as citizens of Mexico, and radically altered the public view of elite notions of progress.

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“…The new coalition, like its more statist and populist predecessor, is based upon a broad, heterodox bargain among (a) economic elites, (b) the presidency (and its state allies), and (c) remnants of both corporatist and populist groups who remain as "holdovers" from the original coalition. Unlike its predecessor coalition, however, the new group is considered to be inclusive without being inclusionary (Teichman, 1992: 100): i.e., power within the multi-class coalition has now shifted toward those elites, both public and private, who share a commitment to a market economy. Though the restructured coalition does not exclude any major group that has traditionally enjoyed representation (like labor, for instance), it has tended to reduce further the power of leaders of populist and/or mass organizations in favor of the interests of a neoliberal duopoly within the coalition of elites (public and private) who favor the market system domestically and free trade internationally.2…”

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confidence: 99%