The Missing Link: Estimating the Impact of Incentives on Teacher Effort and Instructional Effectiveness Using Teacher Accountability Legislation Data

Ahn, Tom

doi:10.1086/673872

Cited by 22 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The estimated effect of performance standards on teacher absences is consistent with previous research on the malleability of teacher effort, as Ahn (2013) and Jacob (2013) fi nd evidence that teacher effort, as measured by teacher absences, responds to incentives. Moreover, the magnitudes of the effects discussed above are similar to those of the estimated effects of a policy change in Chicago that granted principals the discretion to dismiss probationary teachers (Jacob 2013).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 86%

Did No Child Left Behind Affect Teacher Attendance? Evidence from North Carolina

Gershenson¹

2015

Employ. Res.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 86%

Did No Child Left Behind Affect Teacher Attendance? Evidence from North Carolina

Gershenson¹

2015

Employ. Res.

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“…Ahn (2011) found that teachers have fewer absences from work when the bonus outcome is in doubt but no change in absences when there is either a low or high probability of receiving the bonus. In his evaluation of a Kenyan program that rewarded school teachers whose students achieved higher test scores, Glewwe (2010) reported that there was no increase in teacher absences or homework assignments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives

Jones

2013

Economics of Education Review

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Over the last decade many districts have implemented performance pay incentives to reward teachers for improving student test scores. Economic theory suggests that these programs could alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention. Because teachers can choose to work in a performance pay district that has characteristics correlated with teacher behavior, I use the distance between a teacher's undergraduate institution and the nearest performance pay district as an instrumental variable. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), I find that teachers respond to performance pay incentives by working fewer hours per week at school. Performance pay also decreases participation in unpaid cooperative school activities, while there is suggestive evidence that teacher turnover decreases. The treatment effects are heterogeneous; male teachers respond more positively to performance pay than female teachers. In Florida, which restricts state performance pay funding to individual teachers or teams, I find that work effort and teacher turnover increase. JEL Classifications: I21, I28, J33, M5

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“…Research on accountability legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act and other state-specific programs have focused on the impact of introducing market pressures to induce teachers and administrators to increase education output. Market pressure may thus lead principals to compete for the 'best' teachers (Ahn 2013).…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching strategies of teachers and schools in general equilibrium

Ahn

2015

IZA J Labor Econ

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I use a structural matching model, North Carolina public school data, and a survey of teachers' career plans to analyze schools' and teachers' behaviors in the teacher transfer market. Results show that mid-career teachers with better pre-service qualifications are the most eager to search, different types of teachers and schools have different search strategies, and the market is turbulent, characterized by search friction and large movements of teachers to better, worse, or comparable schools. The market is not as stable and orderly as it may first appear. Simulations show that simple policies to direct teacher transfers are at best inefficient. Jel codes: I24; J48; J62

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The Missing Link: Estimating the Impact of Incentives on Teacher Effort and Instructional Effectiveness Using Teacher Accountability Legislation Data

Cited by 22 publications

References 26 publications

Did No Child Left Behind Affect Teacher Attendance? Evidence from North Carolina

Did No Child Left Behind Affect Teacher Attendance? Evidence from North Carolina

Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives

Matching strategies of teachers and schools in general equilibrium

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