The More Fragmented the Better?—The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings

Lutscher, Philipp M.

doi:10.1080/03050629.2016.1093476

Cited by 27 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…However, note that this is not the same as actual counterbalancing due to the adjustment in the index. Therefore, while the direction of the effect is highly suggestive and in accordance with the findings by Dahl (2016b) and Lutscher (2016), I refrain from interpreting the effect size as the actual impact of "counterbalancing." These findings support my idea that the "intentions to fragment" the security apparatus (coup-proofing vs. specialization) matter substantially.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 70%

“…Previous research has considered the effect of counterbalancing on the likelihood of defection, while disregarding this other type of force fragmentation (Dahl 2016a, 2016b; Lutscher 2016). I seek to remedy this gap by hypothesizing counterbalancing and differentiation to have contradicting influences on the likelihood of defection, leading to a unified framework of the relationship between fragmentation and defection during conflict.…”

Section: Expanding the Discussion: Military Fragmentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, especially when facing nonviolent uprisings, the military's motivation to support the regime remains a crucial factor determining their loyalty (Brooks 2017). Counterbalancing leads to decreased endowments and dissatisfaction among military personnel, which lead to an increased risk of soldiers and units to defect to the opposition (Dahl 2016a(Dahl , 2016bLutscher 2016). Based on the notion that differentiation may be associated with increased funds, better training and equipment, and an overall increased leverage, it follows that differentiation decreases the risk of soldiers defecting.…”

Section: Differentiation and Bandwagoning During Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, bandwagoning is not only a substantial explanans for individual-level defections due to security forces avoiding to fight a losing battle but also because of their organizational preference for cohesion: Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham (2014) indicate that military leadership eschews ordering deployments that may be divisive among soldiers and that could lead individual units to break away from the force. Uncertainty over the regime’s survival, as well as suppressing (especially nonviolent) insurrections, critically endanger such internal cohesion and increase group-level defections (Lutscher 2016, 356; Pion-Berlin, Esparza, and Grisham 2014, 233-35).…”

Section: Defection In the Security Apparatusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Jumping on the Bandwagon: Differentiation and Security Defection during Conflict

Dworschak

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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When confronted with mass uprisings, governments deploy their security forces for crowd control or repression. However, sometimes security agencies choose to side with the opposition movement. Recent work shows that “fragmentation” contributes to defection: fragmenting the security forces into parallel units leads to oversight problems and grievances among soldiers, which raises the risk of members of the security forces defecting to the opposition movement. However, I argue that the effect on defection is strongly moderated by the circumstances under which states choose to fragment their military: fragmentation for the purpose of security specialization, called “differentiation,” even decreases its risk. Employing Bayesian multilevel modeling, the findings corroborate this distinction. The study contributes to the fundamental discussion on civil–military relations, shedding light on why some conflict situations see security defections while others do not. Understanding this phenomenon is a pivotal element to explaining how conflicts develop, escalate, and end.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 70%

Section: Expanding the Discussion: Military Fragmentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Differentiation and Bandwagoning During Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Defection In the Security Apparatusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Jumping on the Bandwagon: Differentiation and Security Defection during Conflict

Dworschak

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Such threats of insubordination from the lower ranks, in turn, constrain the options of the military leadership (Dragu & Lupu, 2018). Where a shooting order threatens cohesion in the military apparatus, removing the incumbent may quite well look like an easy way out of the conflict (Lutscher, 2016).…”

Section: Endgame Coups: a Distinct Type Of Military Take Overmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

Kohler

Albrecht

2019

Armed Forces & Society

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This article presents a systematic analysis of military coups following popular mass uprisings in nondemocratic regimes, conceptualized as endgame coups. Drawing on our original, medium- n data set of revolutionary situations, we find that such endgame coups form a distinct type of military intervention in politics. Compared to regular coups, episodes of popular mass contestation prompt conservative interventions in politics of the military’s leadership aimed at preserving the regime’s authoritarian infrastructure. A systematic test of factors characterizing postcoup political trajectories is based on Cox proportional hazard models and provides empirical evidence in contrast to the widely held notion of “democratic coups.” Our findings reveal that endgame coups are conservative rollback coups, executed by military leaderships, that result in continued political instability and illiberal politics.

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Inching Towards Theory

Lambach

Bayer

Bethke

et al. 2020

Nonviolent Resistance and Democratic Consolidation

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The More Fragmented the Better?—The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings

Cited by 27 publications

References 40 publications

Jumping on the Bandwagon: Differentiation and Security Defection during Conflict

Jumping on the Bandwagon: Differentiation and Security Defection during Conflict

Revolutions and the Military: Endgame Coups, Instability, and Prospects for Democracy

Inching Towards Theory

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