2009
DOI: 10.1038/embor.2009.270
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The mousepox experience

Abstract: Can dual‐use research be conducted safely, or are some things simply too dangerous to ever be appropriate research topics? Ronald Jackson and Ian Ramshaw offer their own perspectives in interviews about their groundbreaking work with mousepox virus.

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Cited by 16 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…The researchers recognized that there was a remote possibility of this research being adapted for use in human smallpox as a biological weapon. Nevertheless, despite their reservations and with the advice of various advisory boards they published the research (Selgelid and Weir 2010). When published, however, considerable discussion was initiated regarding the publication of this research and the responsibilities of the scientists involved.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The researchers recognized that there was a remote possibility of this research being adapted for use in human smallpox as a biological weapon. Nevertheless, despite their reservations and with the advice of various advisory boards they published the research (Selgelid and Weir 2010). When published, however, considerable discussion was initiated regarding the publication of this research and the responsibilities of the scientists involved.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is clear that some paradigm cases of dual-use—and, in particular, those that have caused most concern—involve in collective action. In the case of the mousepox study, the lead researcher was involved with Australian government efforts to enhance the myxoma virus’ capacity to control rabbit populations (Selgelid and Weir 2010 ). The H5N1 studies were both funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and the purported public health benefits of the studies were described from the outset (Herfst et al 2012 ; Imai et al 2012 ).…”
Section: A Deeper Accountmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Then, a group of Australian scientists studying ectromelia variola, or mousepox, engineered a strain of the virus that killed 100 % of immunologically naïve and vaccinated mice, and 60 % of genetically resistant mice (Jackson et al 2001 ). Though the work had potential applications in controlling rodent plagues in Australia (Kerr et al 2004 ; Selgelid and Weir 2010 ), and better understanding poxviruses—of which cowpox, monkeypox, and smallpox are all transmissible in humans—the research also had a dark side. The genetic similarity of poxviruses left open the potential for using the research to modify a human-transmissible poxvirus; 1 a recipe for a deadly pandemic (Miller and Selgelid 2008 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, the World has witnessed in recent the emergence of numerous new epidemics, pests and environmental disasters, but none of which had any connection with genetic engineering. GE pathogens (mostly viruses) created by scientists for research purposes [14–16] have –so far– not left the laboratory. Furthermore bacterial agents (unfortunately) contemplated in biological warfare up to now [17] are of natural origin.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%