The Muslim paranoia narrative in counter-radicalisation policy

Aistrope, Tim

doi:10.1080/17539153.2016.1175272

Cited by 19 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Beyond these concerns is the question of credibility. This critique is partially normative, with much of the criticism centered on the idea that CVE policy and counter messaging are overreactions, and that they represent propagandistic state attempts to stifle debate and unpalatable political beliefs (Aistrope, , p. 17). Criticism has been heightened where states have acted covertly.…”

Section: Counter Messaging and Counter Messengersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As well as the idea that governments shouldn’t be involved in counter messaging, questions of credibility also raise the idea that governments and the organizations they support are hopelessly compromised in the eyes of target audiences, and therefore incapable of delivering effective counter messages (Braddock & Horgan, ; p. 386; Schmid, , p. 14). In part, this stems from widely perceived gaps between government policy and narratives (Aistrope, ). Briggs and Feve (, p. 16) have argued that a government “credibility gap” means that governments should limit themselves to enabling other civil society actors to engage in counter messaging work.…”

Section: Counter Messaging and Counter Messengersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…386;Schmid, 2014, p. 14). In part, this stems from widely perceived gaps between government policy and narratives (Aistrope, 2016). Briggs and Feve (2013, p. 16) have argued that a government "credibility gap" means that governments should limit themselves to enabling other civil society actors to engage in counter messaging work.…”

Section: Counter Messaging and Counter Messengersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors

Lee¹

2019

Policy & Internet

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The online space is a haven for extremists of all kinds. Although efforts to remove violent and extremist content are increasing, there is a widely accepted need to also contest extremist messages with counter messages designed to undermine and disrupt extremist narratives. While the majority of academic focus has been on large and well‐funded efforts linked to governments, this article considers the experiences of informal actors who are active in contesting extremist messaging but who lack the support of large institutions. Informal actors come without some of the baggage that accompanies formal counter message campaigns, which have been attacked as lacking in credibility and constituting “just more government propaganda.” This has been noted by some of the wider countering violent extremism industry and the appetite for incorporating “real‐world” content in their campaigns seems to be rising. This article fills a gap in our knowledge of the experiences of informal counter messaging actors. Through a series of in‐depth qualitative interviews it demonstrates that, despite the potentially serious risks of incorporating greater levels of informal content, there is an appetite among informal actors to engage with formal campaigns where they can be selective over who they work with and maintain a degree of control.

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Section: Counter Messaging and Counter Messengersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Counter Messaging and Counter Messengersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Counter Messaging and Counter Messengersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors

Lee¹

2019

Policy & Internet

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“…36 The risks of "sock-puppet" organizations (i.e., organizations claiming to be independent but working to advance specific agendas), have been identified as including worsening trust in government over time, as well as undermining the credibility of other organizations without official ties. 37 A final criticism stems from the lingering doubts about the capabilities of countermessaging actors to produce material that will resonate with audiences. One account of countermessaging in the United States identifies a "preachy" tone as being a key problem with audiences.…”

Section: Critiques Of Countermessagingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging

Lee

2018

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Online countermessaging-communication that seeks to disrupt the online content disseminated by extremist groups and individuals-is a core component of contemporary counterterrorism strategies. Countermessaging has been heavily criticized, not least on the grounds of effectiveness. Whereas current debates are focused on the role of government and large organizations in developing and disseminating countermessages, this article argues that such approaches overlook the informal production of countermessages. Recognizing the appetite for "natural world" content among those engaged in countermessaging, this article highlights some of the potential benefits of informal approaches to countermessaging. At the same time, the article also acknowledges the risks that may result from closer working between countermessaging organizations and informal actors.

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“…By dismissing political grievances as illegitimate and associating them with the work of extremist recruiters and their rhetoric, dominant radicalisation narratives characterise grievances as symptoms of a dysfunctional, conspiratorial and paranoid style of thinking, particularly in Muslim communities which extremist recruiters take advantage of for their agenda. This framing is the basis on which the state ignores Muslim grievances – because they are not real but imaginary (Aistrope, 2016).…”

Section: Academic Engagement With the Prevent Groupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Just get on with it: Implementing the Prevent duty in higher education and the role of academic expertise

Qurashi

2017

Education, Citizenship and Social

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The Prevent policy was introduced in 2003 as part of the UK counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) with the aim of preventing the radicalisation of people to terrorism. In 2015, it was given a statutory footing in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act and it became a legal duty for Higher Education Institutions among others. Since then, Higher Education Institutions have been working to ensure their compliance with the legal duty. This article reflects on the implementation of the Prevent duty in one university. It is informed by an engagement with the Prevent group in the university which was created to implement the Prevent duty. The article argues that academic expertise had little impact in shaping the implementation of the Prevent duty at the university because the epistemic stance of counter-terrorism side lines expertise and evidence so that it can maintain its coherence and integrity. Specifically, the impact of academic expertise was limited because critically oriented academic expertise complicates a straightforward implementation of the legal duty, a state-centric orientation in the Prevent group constrained the horizon of discussion, and a crisis of knowledge at the heart of counter-terrorism replaces expertise and evidence with ideology.

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The Muslim paranoia narrative in counter-radicalisation policy

Cited by 19 publications

References 36 publications

Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors

Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors

Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging

Just get on with it: Implementing the Prevent duty in higher education and the role of academic expertise

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