The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves

Abstract

Two experiments, one conducted with American college students and one with Israeli pilots and their instructors, explored the predictive power of reputation-based assessments versus the stated "name of the game" (Wall Street Game vs. Community Game) in determining players' responses in an N-move Prisoner's Dilemma. The results of these studies showed that the relevant labeling manipulations exerted far greater impact on the players' choice to cooperate versus defect--both in the first round and overall--than anticipated by the individuals who had predicted their behavior. Reputation-based prediction, by contrast, failed to discriminate cooperators from defectors. A supplementary questionnaire study showed the generality of the relevant short-coming in naïve psychology. The implications of these findings, and the potential contribution of the present methodology to the classic pedagogical strategy of the demonstration experiment, are discussed.

Talking money: How market-based valuation can undermine environmental protection

“…For example, simply using market terms like 'sellers' and 'buyers' to describe the payoffs in game theoretic experiments, already makes subjects diverge from what fairness norms prescribe towards more self-interested responses (Bowles, 2008(Bowles, , p. 1606Hoffman et al, 1994, p. 370). When a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game is labeled 'the Community Game', for example, roughly twice as much respondents are willing to cooperate compared to when it is labeled 'the Wall Street Game' (Liberman et al, 2004(Liberman et al, , p. 1777.…”

The articulation of government policy: Health insurance mandates versus taxes

“…For example, if the goal is to discourage a behavior, the government could prohibit the behavior and enforce the prohibition with a fine or, alternatively, tax the behavior without an explicit prohibition. Traditional models of tax policy would treat the tax and the fine as equivalent so long as the magnitude and probability of their being imposed were equal, but articulating the policy with a prohibition may emphasize a moral obligation or invoke different levels of moral suasion (see Liberman et al, 2004). In addition, the prohibition could carry different information about social norms or directly shape social norms regarding a behavior (Benabou and Tirole, 2011;Elster, 1989).…”

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“…For example, referring to a prisoner's dilemma game as the "Community Game" as opposed to the "Wall Street Game" can double the cooperation rate (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004). Doubts have therefore arisen as to whether existing theories of human behaviour can account for observations from even the most simplistic and controlled laboratory interactions as represented by games (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006;Levitt & List, 2007;Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004).…”