In this paper, we want to analyze conceptually whether and when merely using economic discourse -talking money -can crowd out people's positive attitudes towards environmental goods and their reasons to protect them. We concentrate on the specific case of market-based or monetary valuation (MV) as an instance of 'commodification in discourse' and argue that it can have the same moral problems as real commodification. We aim to bring together insights from philosophy (pluralistic value theory), ethics (corruption), economics and psychology (crowding-out) to argue that there are good reasons to think about how and when to apply MV in environmental cases. On the basis of this interdisciplinary analysis and in order to promote further empirical research, we develop four empirically falsifiable hypotheses. (i) Commodification in discourse can bring about real commodification. (ii) MV can have framing and crowding effects on those who come into contact with it. (iii) Intrinsic motivation is more robust than extrinsic motivation and leads less to freeriding. (iv) MV's framing and crowding effects can decrease (demand and support for) environmental protection.

The surge in the supply of intermittent renewable energy creates new challenges for electricity networks. The high variation in the supply either requires costly network extensions or the implementation of incentives that reduce peaks. One variant of the latter are dynamic tariffs. While dynamic pricing provides an efficient tariff scheme, people may perceive it as unfair. This paper examines to which extent such peak pricing is actually unfair and, if so, how this unfairness can be lessened by adapting the tariff design. We discuss the efficiency arguments for dynamic pricing and subsequently the acceptability and perceived fairness. In addition, we contrast these perceptions with fairness criteria derived from ethical theories. We conclude that dynamic pricing does not necessarily need to be unfair. In particular, the fairness depends to a significant extent on the concrete tariff implementation. The perceived fairness of dynamic pricing can be strengthened by using the revenues for measures related to the grid, providing clear common-language arguments, mediating adverse consequences for the least well-off, and minimizing unpredictability. 1 This paper is written as part of the research project "Redesigning the electricity market in order to facilitate the transition towards a sustainable energy system", financed by NWO and various stakeholders in the energy sector. The authors thank the members of the Valorisation Board as well as the Scientific Advisory Board for their input during this project. The authors, however, are fully responsible for the contents of this paper.

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Some recent policy-oriented publications have put forward a third category of environmental values, namely relational or eudaimonic values, in addition to intrinsic and instrumental values. In this debate, there is, however, much confusion about the content of such values. This paper looks at a fundamental debate in ethics about a third category of reasons besides reasons from morality and self-interest, labelled as reasons of love, care or meaningfulness. This category allows us, first, to see the relation between relational and eudaimonic values, and, second, to make clear and applicable distinctions between the relational valuing of nature and moral or instrumental valuing.

The IPBES Framework aims to allow room for a plurality of values and recently proposed a move from `Ecosystem Services’ to `Nature’s Contributions to People’. O’Connor and Kenter (2019) argue that both approaches still disregard nature as an end in itself. Therefore, they propose a new conceptualisation of `intrinsic value’ and a new approach, labelled the `Life Framework of Values’. This work is highly relevant, but we argue that there are some fundamental conceptual problems with their current account, in particular with the conceptualisation of intrinsic value, relational value, and their category of `living as’. We argue that the changes made to the underlying framework of O’Neill add more confusion than clarification, that it is better to return to the original framework and to focus energy on making that framework applicable.