The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector

Abstract

D72, H57, K40, L10, Corruption, Deterrence, Media, Governance,

Influencing the Public and Efficiency in Bureaucratic Provision

“…Second, because influencing the public involves a contest of arguments, the usage of the function m b /( m b + m s ) to capture the impact of influencing is consistent with the recent approach adopted in the public choice literature to model similar phenomena such as the win probabilities of contending parties in an adversarial lawsuit (as in Farmer and Pecorino (1999) and Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001)) and the verdict of the public when exposed to arguments between the media and the government over a corruption scandal (as in Vaidya (2005, 2006)) 9 . Skaperdas and Vaidya (unpublished data, 2009) also suggest that such a CSF approach to model outcomes from a contest of arguments can be consistent with the recipient of arguments using a Bayesian inference process to arrive at a judgment.…”

Corruption Via Media Capture: The Effect of Competition

“…Our article complements the findings of the existing literature on media and governance (in particular, Vaidya ; Corneo ; Petrova ) as follows. Both Vaidya () and Vaidya () examine the incentives for a government to engage in corruption amidst an impending threat of media allegations.…”

“…Our article complements the findings of the existing literature on media and governance (in particular, Vaidya ; Corneo ; Petrova ) as follows. Both Vaidya () and Vaidya () examine the incentives for a government to engage in corruption amidst an impending threat of media allegations. However, unlike the current article, Vaidya () focuses purely on the case of media monopoly and while Vaidya () addresses the impact of competition in the media on government's incentive to engage in corruption, it abstracts from the possibility of collusion between the two entities.…”

“…Both Vaidya () and Vaidya () examine the incentives for a government to engage in corruption amidst an impending threat of media allegations. However, unlike the current article, Vaidya () focuses purely on the case of media monopoly and while Vaidya () addresses the impact of competition in the media on government's incentive to engage in corruption, it abstracts from the possibility of collusion between the two entities. Its focus is purely on government's choice of engaging in corruption outside collusion relying on its ability to manipulate the probability of exposure through its public relations campaign amidst media scrutiny.…”

Persuasion as a contest

“…Earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was an extensive research effort on advertising (Schmalensee 1972) and for decades there has been extensive related research on marketing (Bell et al 1975). More recently there has been research using contests in the study of litigation (Farmer and Pecorino 1999;Bernardo et al 2000;Hirshleifer and Osborne 2001), political campaigns (Snyder 1989;Baron 1994;Skaperdas and Grofman 1995), bureaucratic organization and corporate governance (Warneryd 1998;Mueller and Warneryd 2001;Konrad 2004), or media politics (Vaidya 2005(Vaidya , 2006.…”