it is plausible that being an evil person is a matter of having a particularly morally depraved character. i argue that suffering from extreme moral vices-and not consistently lacking moral vices, for example-suffices for being evil. alternatively, i defend an extremity account concerning evil personhood against consistency accounts of evil personhood. after clarifying what it is for vices to be extreme, i note that the extremity thesis i defend allows that a person could suffer from both extremely vicious character traits while possessing some modest virtue as well. By contrast, consistency theses rule out this possibility by definition. this result does not suggest that extremity accounts are flawed, however, since, as i argue, the thesis that evil people must lack moral virtue altogether effectively defines evil people out of existence and prematurely privileges skepticism about evil personhood. Ultimately, i contend that an extremity account is most consistent with common intuitions about putative evil persons as well as plausible assumptions about aretaic evaluations of character quite generally. the main fallacy which prevents people from recognizing potential Hitlers before they have shown their true faces. .. lies in the belief that a thoroughly destructive and evil man must be a devil-and look his part; that he must be devoid of any positive quality; that he must bear the sign of Cain.. .. There is hardly a man who is utterly devoid of any kindness, of any good intentions.. .. Hence, as long as one believes that the evil man wears horns, one will not discover an evil man.-erich Fromm (1973, 432) i. intrODUCtiOn ny plausible account of evil personhood must take seriously the above observation that many evildoers, even the perpetrators of great atrocities, are in some