The Nature of Fiction

Abstract

This important book provides a theory about the nature of fiction, and about the relation between the author, the reader and the fictional text. The approach is philosophical: that is to say, the author offers an account of key concepts such as fictional truth, fictional characters, and fiction itself. The book argues that the concept of fiction can be explained partly in terms of communicative intentions, partly in terms of a condition which excludes relations of counterfactual dependence between the world and the text. This communicative model is then applied to the following problems: how can something be 'true in the story' without being explicitly stated in the text? In what ways does interpreting a fictional story depend upon grasping its author's intentions? Is there always a unique best interpretation of a fictional text? What is the correct semantics for fictional names? What is the nature of our emotional response to a fictional work? In answering these questions the author explores the complex interaction between author, reader, and text. This interaction requires the reader to construct a 'fictional author' - a character in the story whose personality, beliefs and emotional states must be interpreted if the reader is to grasp the meaning of the work.

Missing systems and the face value practice

“…54 Although not, for example, when we are joking, or when we are being sarcastic, and perhaps not when we are speaking metaphorically. 55 See John Searle's "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse," reprinted as essay 3 of his (1979), and Lewis (1978, p. 40) for two prominent expressions of this view, which Currie (1990, p. 12) calls the "pretense theory"; and see Currie (1990), p. 13, n. 14 for references to a number of other appearances of it in the literature. See also ibid., section 1.4 ff., and Walton (1990), pp.…”

Is the paradox of fiction soluble in psychology?

“…It is next argued that, while (PF3) is true of emotions, it is false of quasi-emotions. In the latter case, believing that p should be replaced by make-believing that p, this explaining why quasi-emotions are so typical of our interactions with works of fiction (Currie, 1990). This solution constitutes a genuine attempt at solving the paradox of fiction: it recognizes that the three propositions (PF1)-(PF3) are incompatible, rejects (PF1) and explains why it seems attractive.…”

“…One popular solution has been to reject (PF1) in arguing that we do not feel genuine emotions for fictional characters (e.g. Walton 1978;Currie, 1990).…”

Los límites de la tesis de la incorporación

“…Los autores (leWis, 1978;Currie, 1990;Walton, 1990;bonomi-zuCChi, 2003;garCía-CarPintero, 2007, por ejemplo) que se han dedicado a esta cuestión han tratado de dar las condiciones de verdad de proposiciones que instancian [F]. Tratan de mostrar que las proposiciones verdaderas de acuerdo con la ficción son aquellas relativas a un mundo en el cual ocurre todo lo que se describe en la novela y, en lo demás, pertenece al conjunto de mundos más cercanos al mundo real compatible con la primera restricción.…”