The Necessity of Mutual Trust for Cooperative Behavior in a Two-Person Game

Rekosh, Jerold H.; Feigenbaum, Kenneth D.

doi:10.1080/00224545.1966.9919713

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Relative structural or position power is often noted as an important factor in determining the bargaining strategies of negotiating parties and the settlements reached by those parties (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; De Dreu & van Kleef, 2004; Habeeb, 1988). Existing empirical research would support the notion that relative power influences negotiation processes such as cooperation (e.g., Rekosh & Feigenbaum, 1966; Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Novinson, 1970) as well as joint outcomes (e.g., McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986). In fact, in many negotiations, it is likely that the more powerful party in the dyad could determine the outcomes of negotiation unilaterally, although powerful actors do not always use or invoke such power (e.g., Conlon, Carnevale, & Murnighan, 1994).…”

Section: Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

When is straightforwardness a liability in negotiations? The role of integrative potential and structural power.

DeRue

Conlon

Moon

et al. 2009

Journal of Applied Psychology

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Negotiations present individuals with a paradox. On the one hand, individuals are expected via social norms and formal regulations to be honest and straightforward in their negotiations. On the other hand, individuals who mislead their negotiation counterpart are often rewarded with more favorable settlements. The authors investigate this paradox by examining the relationship between negotiators' dispositional straightforwardness and concessions made during a negotiation. Drawing from the dual concern model (D. G. Pruitt & J. Z. Rubin, 1986), the authors show how dispositional straightforwardness leads individuals to develop a greater concern for their counterpart's interests, which in turn leads to greater concession making during the negotiation. The authors then show how this individual-level relationship is moderated by features of the negotiation task, namely integrative potential and power.

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Section: Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

When is straightforwardness a liability in negotiations? The role of integrative potential and structural power.

DeRue

Conlon

Moon

et al. 2009

Journal of Applied Psychology

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“…The trust game is a paradigm widely used to study how humans modulate behavior based on social interactions ( Rekosh & Feigenbaum, 1966 ; Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995 ; King-Casas et al, 2005 ; Delgado, Frank & Phelps, 2005 ; Fareri, Chang & Delgado, 2012 ; Fouragnan et al, 2013 ). In the game, on each trial, the participant receives an endowment (e.g., $1) and can choose to either keep the money or share it with a fictional partner.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The personality trait of behavioral inhibition modulates perceptions of moral character and performance during the trust game: behavioral results and computational modeling

Radell

Sanchez

Weinflash

et al. 2016

PeerJ

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Decisions based on trust are critical for human social interaction. We judge the trustworthiness of partners in social interactions based on a number of partner characteristics as well as experiences with those partners. These decisions are also influenced by personality. The current study examined how the personality trait of behavioral inhibition, which involves the tendency to avoid or withdraw from novelty in both social and non-social situations, is related to explicit ratings of trustworthiness as well as decisions made in the trust game. In the game, healthy young adults interacted with three fictional partners who were portrayed as trustworthy, untrustworthy or neutral through biographical information. Participants could choose to keep $1 or send $3 of virtual money to a partner. The partner could then choose to send $1.5 back to the participant or to keep the entire amount. On any trial in which the participant chose to send, the partner always reciprocated with 50% probability, irrespective of how that partner was portrayed in the biography. Behavioral inhibition was assessed through a self-report questionnaire. Finally, a reinforcement learning computational model was fit to the behavior of each participant. Self-reported ratings of trust confirmed that all participants, irrespective of behavioral inhibition, perceived differences in the moral character of the three partners (trustworthiness of good > neutral > bad partner). Decisions made in the game showed that inhibited participants tended to trust the neutral partner less than uninhibited participants. In contrast, this was not reflected in the ratings of the neutral partner (either pre- or post-game), indicating a dissociation between ratings of trustworthiness and decisions made by inhibited participants. Computational modeling showed that this was due to lower initial trust of the neutral partner rather than a higher learning rate associated with loss, suggesting an implicit bias against the neutral partner. Overall, the results suggest inhibited individuals may be predisposed to interpret neutral or ambiguous information more negatively which could, at least in part, account for the tendency to avoid unfamiliar people characteristic of behaviorally inhibited temperament, as well as its relationship to anxiety disorders.

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“…Negotiators base their opening offers largely on cues regarding the power structure within a dyad, such as BATNA (Buelens & Van Poucke, 2004). Generally speaking, research has shown that similarity in negotiators' level of power tends to lead to more cooperative negotiations (Baranowski & Summers, 1972;Deignan, 1970;McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, & Campos, 1973;Pepitone, 1970;Rekosh & Feigenbaum, 1966;Sheposh & Gallo, 1973;Solomon, 1960;Swingle, 1970). For example, Komorita and Barnes (1969) examined the effects of relative power using a bilateral monopoly game, in which players have to divide a sum between them in order to reach agreement.…”

Section: Negotiator Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

The psychology of negotiation and mediation.

Gelfand¹,

Fulmer²,

Severance³

2011

APA Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol 3: Maintaining, Expanding, and Contracting the Organization.

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Under the broadest umbrella, emotion includes mood, affect, feelings, and discrete emotions. Generally speaking, emotions and feelings are more transitory and intense than affect and mood (Forgas, 1992), but the exact definitions of these terms vary across studies. Because researchers have used these terms interchangeably (Barry & Oliver, 1996), we review research on emotion that covers all of these conceptualizations.

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The Necessity of Mutual Trust for Cooperative Behavior in a Two-Person Game

Cited by 12 publications

References 6 publications

When is straightforwardness a liability in negotiations? The role of integrative potential and structural power.

When is straightforwardness a liability in negotiations? The role of integrative potential and structural power.

The personality trait of behavioral inhibition modulates perceptions of moral character and performance during the trust game: behavioral results and computational modeling

The psychology of negotiation and mediation.

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