The Neural Basis of Introspection

Guggisberg, Adrian G.; Dalal, Sarang S.; Nagarajan, S.

doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(09)71638-6

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Our paradigm did not enable a valid comparison between trials in which metacognition was present and trials where it was absent. However, a recent study on interoception of event-times (Guggisberg et al, 2011) has done so. Interestingly, the patterns of neural activity that was related to introspection depended on the target of introspection, i.e., whether it concerned auditory perception, intentional or motor events.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognitive awareness of covert somatosensory attention corresponds to contralateral alpha power

Whitmarsh

Barendregt

Schoffelen³

et al. 2014

NeuroImage

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Studies on metacognition have shown that participants can report on their performance on a wide range of perceptual, memory and behavioral tasks. We know little, however, about the ability to report on one's attentional focus. The degree and direction of somatosensory attention can, however, be readily discerned through suppression of alpha band frequencies in EEG/MEG produced by the somatosensory cortex. Such top-down attentional modulations of cortical excitability have been shown to result in better discrimination performance and decreased response times. In this study we asked whether the degree of attentional focus is also accessible for subjective report, and whether such evaluations correspond to the amount of somatosensory alpha activity. In response to auditory cues participants maintained somatosensory attention to either their left or right hand for intervals varying randomly between 5 and 32 seconds, while their brain activity was recorded with MEG. Trials were terminated by a probe sound, to which they reported their level of attention on the cued hand right before probe-onset. Using a beamformer approach, we quantified the alpha activity in left and right somatosensory regions, one second before the probe. Alpha activity from contra- and ipsilateral somatosensory cortices for high versus low attention trials were compared. As predicted, the contralateral somatosensory alpha depression correlated with higher reported attentional focus. Finally, alpha activity two to three seconds before the probe-onset was correlated with attentional focus. We conclude that somatosensory attention is indeed accessible to metacognitive awareness.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metacognitive awareness of covert somatosensory attention corresponds to contralateral alpha power

Whitmarsh

Barendregt

Schoffelen³

et al. 2014

NeuroImage

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“…Thus, there is no neural evidence for the existence of an omnipresent observer or “decider” (see discussion in Montemayor, Allen, & Morsella, 2013). See additional neural evidence for the lack of such an omnipresent observer in Guggisberg, Dalal, and Nagarajan (2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Prospective Nature of Voluntary Action: Insights from the Reflexive Imagery Task

Bhangal

Cho

Geisler

et al. 2016

Review of General Psychology

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Voluntary action is peculiar in several ways. For example, it is highly prospective in nature, requiring the activation of the representations of anticipated action-effects (e.g., a button pressed). These prospective action-effects can represent outcomes in the short-term (e.g., fingers snapping or uttering “cheers”) or in the long-term (e.g., building a house). In this review about the prospective nature of voluntary action, we first discuss in brief ideomotor theory, a theoretical approach that illuminates both the nature of the prospective representations in voluntary action and how these representations are acquired and subsequently used in the control of behavior. In this framework, prospective action-effects could be construed as ‘action options’ that, residing in consciousness, may or may not influence upcoming behavior, depending on the nature of the other prospective action-effects that happen to be coactivated at that time. In ideomotor theory, there is no homunculus that selects one prospective action-effect over another. Many of these prospective action-effects enter consciousness automatically. Second, we introduce the principle of atemporality and discuss the prospective nature of determining tendencies and mental simulation, all in the context of new findings from the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT). The RIT reveals that, as a function of external control, prospective action-effects can enter consciousness in a reflex-like, automatic, and insuppressible manner. The RIT and its associated theoretical framework shed light on why the activation of such representations, though often undesired, is nonetheless adaptive and why not all of these prospective representations lead to overt action.

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Cognitive and neural components of the phenomenology of agency

2010

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A primary aspect of the self is the sense of agency – the sense that one is causing an action. In the spirit of recent reductionistic approaches to other complex, multifaceted phenomena (e.g., working memory; cf. Johnson &Johnson, 2009), we attempt to unravel the sense of agency by investigating its most basic components, without invoking high-level conceptual or 'central executive' processes. After considering the high-level components of agency, we examine the cognitive and neural underpinnings of its low-level components, which include basic consciousness and subjective urges (e.g., the urge to breathe when holding one's breath). Regarding urges, a quantitative review revealed that certain inter-representational dynamics (conflicts between action plans, as when holding one's breath) reliably engender fundamental aspects both of the phenomenology of agency and of 'something countering the will of the self'. The neural correlates of such dynamics, for both primordial urges (e.g., air hunger) and urges elicited in laboratory interference tasks, are entertained. In addition, we discuss the implications of this unique perspective for the study of disorders involving agency.

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The Neural Basis of Introspection

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Metacognitive awareness of covert somatosensory attention corresponds to contralateral alpha power

Metacognitive awareness of covert somatosensory attention corresponds to contralateral alpha power

The Prospective Nature of Voluntary Action: Insights from the Reflexive Imagery Task

Cognitive and neural components of the phenomenology of agency

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