The neurosociology of Auguste Comte

Abstract

<jats:p> This article explores the role of phrenology in the work of Auguste Comte. I begin by reviewing the historical and contemporary significance of this doctrine to show the direct lineage that exists between phrenology and what we now call cognitive neuroscience. I then demonstrate the impact of phrenology on Comte’s sociological theory and make the claim that his paradigm exemplifies what TenHouten called ‘neurosociology.’ Following this, I show how Comte’s social epistemology rejected biological reductionism and considered neurophysiology a subfield of sociology. This results in a somewhat startling assertion: Comte saw sociology as a cognitive science. After outlining Comte’s original vision for sociology as a discipline, I place Comte’s system in critical contact with 21st century neuroscience and suggest fruitful ways to move the neurosociology paradigm forward. In this I demonstrate that Comte’s vision for sociology is worth pursuing today, even while the specifics of his doctrine are not. </jats:p>

Comte and Vygotsky: Revealing the unacknowledged commonalities.

“…Thus, since morals brings biology and sociology into close combination, does it mean that Comte’s psychological project coincides with neurosociology? McVeigh (2020) stated that “neurosociology was Comte’s strategy” (p. 349), but it is not that simple. Perhaps, it was his initial strategy, but when Comte introduced the distinction between sociology and morals in System of Positive Polity , his vision of the final science went beyond neurosociology.…”

The microbiome‐gut‐brain and social behavior

“…Relational biology may cause sociologists who have not already done so to question the intellectual and institutional boundaries that have developed between the social and life sciences. Sociologists scoff at Comte's hierarchical taxonomy of the sciences that placed sociology at science's apex (see McVeigh, 2020), but rarely challenge their own practices of theoretical compartmentalization in favor of relational approaches to sociology (Emirbayer, 1997) and sociological analysis of the ‘whole person’ (Ignatow, 2012; Mauss, 1979) rather than analysis via biological, psychological, or sociological (Duster, 2006; Granovetter, 1985) reductionisms. Insofar as the social sciences are positioned institutionally to contribute to the study of complex biopsychosocial phenomena, MGB theory may provide useful bridging concepts for future interdisciplinary inquiry (see Brossard & Sallée, 2020).…”