This paper is concerned with ion-exchange removal packed bed studies carried out with secondary effluent on a sewage treatment works. The work was carried out over a five month secondment period with Severn Trent Water, situated in the midlands of England. The objective of the work was to compare previous studies with clinoptilolite using synthetic wastewaters, de-ionised water and appropriate salts, with typical process water found on a sewage treatment plant. Experimental results have shown ammonium removal of 90% and greater of the influent NH4+ concentrations. In this report it has been shown that the biological activity of nitrification takes place during the upflow processing of wastewater through the packed beds. It is also shown how other cations cause an inhibitory effect on the ion-exchange process whereas biological activity leads to improved efficiency.

This article highlights the role played by the body in the work of George Herbert Mead. For Mead, the social emergence of mind depends on human physiology. This is revealed through a detailed exploration of three thematic domains in his work: the organism–environment dyad, perception, and the manipulatory stage of the act. From this, I argue that Mead saw the body as constitutive of cognition and central to the development of mind and self. Present‐day research supports this view and demonstrates Mead's relevance for understanding embodied cognition.

This article focuses on Auguste Comte’s understanding of the organism–environment relationship. It makes three key claims therein: (a) Comte’s metaphysical position privileged materiality and relativized the intellect along two dimensions: one related to the biological organism, one related to the social environment; (b) this twofold materiality confounds attempts to reduce cognition to either nature or nurture, so Comte’s position has interesting parallels to the field of ‘epigenetics’, which sees the social environment as a causative factor in biology; and (c) although Comte ultimately diverged from the ‘postgenomic’ view in crucial ways, he remains a forerunner of the trend towards viewing the social and biological as entangled. Tending to these dimensions challenges the view that Comte is notable from a classical standpoint but ignorable from a contemporary one. It consequently invites renewed attention to his theoretical system.

Recent research in cognitive science has provided broad empirical support for the model of cognition and self‐development formulated by G.H. Mead. This is demonstrated specifically through three distinct cognitive mechanisms: basic‐level categories, mirror neurons, and joint‐attention schemes. These mechanisms illustrate a form of embodied sociality that underscores the intersubjective foundation of mind and self articulated by Mead. Research on basic‐level categories, mirror neurons, and joint‐attention schemes further extends Mead's relevance outside standard sociological and social psychological circles to the field of cognitive science and its emerging focus on sociality and social interaction.

This article explores the role of phrenology in the work of Auguste Comte. I begin by reviewing the historical and contemporary significance of this doctrine to show the direct lineage that exists between phrenology and what we now call cognitive neuroscience. I then demonstrate the impact of phrenology on Comte’s sociological theory and make the claim that his paradigm exemplifies what TenHouten called ‘neurosociology.’ Following this, I show how Comte’s social epistemology rejected biological reductionism and considered neurophysiology a subfield of sociology. This results in a somewhat startling assertion: Comte saw sociology as a cognitive science. After outlining Comte’s original vision for sociology as a discipline, I place Comte’s system in critical contact with 21st century neuroscience and suggest fruitful ways to move the neurosociology paradigm forward. In this I demonstrate that Comte’s vision for sociology is worth pursuing today, even while the specifics of his doctrine are not.