The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective

Pfeifer, Niki

doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.838189

Cited by 70 publications

(71 citation statements)

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“…This approach represents a substantive psychological claim about the nature of the representations underpinning human inference and action, one which we have argued is unlikely to be true (Oaksford & Chater, 2010, 2013. Moreover, recently Fernbach and Erb (2013) have proposed a CBN model of modus ponens in causal conditional reasoning where disablers are represented explicitly as in Figure 1.…”

Section: Figure 1 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In establishing this point we will present some arguments that causal 7 Bayes nets (CBNs) can provide a good framework within which to develop a theory of conditional reasoning and we show that CBNs can naturally account for these patterns of inference (Ali, Chater, & Oaksford, 2011;Fernbach & Erb, 2013;Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013.…”

Section: However Recently Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2005) Have Promentioning

confidence: 99%

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Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning

Oaksford

Chater

2014

Thinking & Reasoning

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In this paper, it is argued that single function dual process theory is a more credible psychological account of non-monotonicity in human conditional reasoning than recent attempts to apply logic programming (LP) approaches in artificial intelligence to these data.LP is introduced and among other critiques, it is argued that it is psychologically unrealistic in a similar way to hash coding in the classicism vs connectionism debate. Second, it is argued that causal Bayes nets provide a framework for modelling probabilistic conditional inference in System 2 that can deal with patterns of inference LP cannot. Third, we offer some speculations on how the cognitive system may avoid problems for System 1 identified by Fodor in 1983. We conclude that while many problems remain, the probabilistic single function dual processing theory is to be preferred over LP as an account of the nonmonotonicity of human reasoning. Dual process theories (Evans 2003(Evans , 2007Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Kahneman, 2011;Sloman, 1996;Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000;Wason & Evans, 1975) invoke two separate cognitive systems to explain performance on a variety of cognitive tasks. These are labelled System 1 and System 2. System 1 is rapid, parallel, automatic, do not require the resources of working memory (WM), and only their final product is posted in consciousness.In contrast, System 2 is slow sequential, and analytic and makes use of the central working memory system. In particular, System 2 ''permits abstract hypothetical thinking that cannot be achieved by System 1' ' (Evans 2003, p. 454). Recently, Oaksford and Chater (2012) argued that accounting for non-monotonic or defeasible reasoning in dual process theory required that both System 2 WM representations and System 1 long term memory (LTM) representations need to be interpreted probabilistically. This position is consistent with Evans and Over (2004; see also Over, Evans, & Elqayam, 2010) adoption of probability logic (Adams, 1998) as underpinning analytic processes in System 2. But it contrasts with accounts which treat analytic processes in System 2 as underpinned by standard binary truth functional logic (Heit & Rotello, 2010;Klauer et al., 2010;Rips, 2001Rips, , 2002 Stanovich & West, 2000;Stanovich, 2011). Oaksford and Chater (2012) labelled the former approach, the single function dual process (SFDP) approach and the latter the dual function dual process (DFDP) approach. Our goal in this paper is to confront some further problems and challenges for the probabilistic SFDP approach but first we rehearse Oaksford and Chater's (2012) argument in detail. Probabilistic Single Function Dual Process TheoryBoth the dual process theory (Evans 2002) and the probabilistic approach (Oaksford and Chater 1991, 1998 developed out of a critique of the classical logicist approach to cognitive architecture (Fodor 1975;Pylyshyn 1984), which is a logical single 4 function dual process theory. The store of world knowledge in LTM consists of a consistent set of logical formulae i...

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Section: Figure 1 About Herementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: However Recently Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2005) Have Promentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning

Oaksford

Chater

2014

Thinking & Reasoning

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“…For about ten years now, empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed: More and more psychological studies of reasoning adopted probabilistic approaches as rationality frameworks (e.g., [3,15,25,30,34,35,39,40,45]). Many studies provided new evidence for the psychological plausibility of the conditional event interpretation of indicative conditionals.…”

Section: Introduction and Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals

Pfeifer

2013

Stud Logica

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Abstract.There is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. In psychology, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the normative standard of reference. Experimental tasks, evaluation of the participants' responses and psychological model building, were inspired by the semantics of the material conditional. Recent empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed.I argue why neither logic nor standard probability theory provide appropriate rationality norms for uncertain conditionals. I advocate coherence based probability logic as an appropriate framework for investigating uncertain conditionals. Detailed proofs of the probabilistic non-informativeness of a paradox of the material conditional illustrate the approach from a formal point of view. I survey selected data on human reasoning about uncertain conditionals which additionally support the plausibility of the approach from an empirical point of view.Keywords: coherence, conditionals, formal epistemology, paradoxes of the material conditional, probability logic, psychology of reasoning Introduction and overviewThere is a long tradition in formal epistemology and in the psychology of reasoning to investigate indicative conditionals. 1 In the psychology of reasoning, the propositional calculus was taken for granted to be the correct normative standard of reference for investigating conditionals [14]. The chosen normative standard of reference guided the construction of psychological theories like a roadmap [37]. Proof-theoretic semantics, for example, stimulated the emergence of two prominent psychological theories of reasoning: Rips' theory of mental rules [47] and Braine and O'Brien's theory of mental logic [6]. Both are rule-based. Likewise, model-theoretic semantics influenced Johnson-Laird's psychological mental models theory [27].Not only psychological theories but also the experimental paradigms for investigating human conditional reasoning were strongly influenced by the Presented by Name of Editor; Received ** **,**** 1 Indicative conditionals are of the form "If A, then C", where the antecedent A and the consequent C are propositions. The ¬A ∧ C and ¬A ∧ ¬C cases are not irrelevant. They rather make A ⊃ C true. Thus, propositional logic also provided rationality criteria for evaluating human inference: Logical validity and the interpretation of indicative conditionals as material conditionals were the most important rationality criteria for assessing human reasoning performance. The participant's interpretation of indicative conditionals was classified as "rational" if, and only if the participant's interpretation is consistent with the semantics of the material conditional. For about ten years now, empirical work on indicative conditionals focuses on uncertainty. Consequently, the normative standard of reference has changed: More and more psychological studies of reasoning adopted proba...

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“…This is counterintuitive and does not match the experimental data. The coherence approach to probability, however, avoids such problems with zero antecedent probabilities and has already been successfully applied to many fields including human reasoning (Pfeifer and Kleiter 2009;Pfeifer 2013). Thus, I am convinced that coherence based probability logic and experimental investigations beyond Bayes' theorem fruitfully extend the probabilistic approach to pragmatics outlined by F&J.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By conversational implicature, so Adams' argument goes, people inter- Recent work suggests that conditional probability is formally and descriptively useful to represent (uncertain) conditionals (see, e.g., Baratgin, Over, and Politzer 2014;Fugard, Pfeifer, and Mayerhofer 2011;Pfeifer 2013). If we interpret Theorem 2 in terms of conditionals (⇒), it is easy to see that the antecedent of the first premise is added (or cumulated) to the antecedent of the second premise, which results into the following Cut rule (also called "Cumulative Transitivity rule"):…”

Section: Example 1: Probabilistic Informativeness Of Transitivitymentioning

confidence: 99%