The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy

Dawid, Richard; Hartmann, Stephan

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1408-x

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…However, localizing debates to individual fields of research is well in line with the recent trend in philosophy of science (e.g. Magnus and Callender 2004;Ruhmkorff 2013;Park 2019;Asay 2019;Vickers 2019;Dawid and Hartmann 2018), and I will here actually also introduce another field of research (psychometry), next to the one (nuclear physics) extensively discussed by Morrison (2011) and myself (Boge 2020), to which the argument can be applied.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 67%

“…I believe that they do not: In an extension of a recent argument against the NMA (Boge 2020), I will show that there is a pessimistic induction that threatens even SSR. The main result of this paper is the establishment of a thorough connection between the recent debate over the NMA (Henderson 2017;Dawid and Hartmann 2018;Boge 2020) and the ensuing debate about the PMI, which results in a stronger (though not in the same sense historical) challenge that needs to be answered even by the SSRist. This is an improvement over Boge (2020), where I neither acknowledged the connection between the framework developed therein and the PMI nor made the implications for SSR explicit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Incompatibility and the pessimistic induction: a challenge for selective realism

Boge

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Two powerful arguments have famously dominated the realism debate in philosophy of science: The No Miracles Argument (NMA) and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). A standard response to the PMI is selective scientific realism (SSR), wherein only the working posits of a theory are considered worthy of doxastic commitment. Building on the recent debate over the NMA and the connections between the NMA and the PMI, I here consider a stronger inductive argument that poses a direct challenge for SSR: Because it is sometimes exactly the working posits which contradict each other, i.e., that which is directly responsible for empirical success, SSR cannot deliver a general explanation of scientific success.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 67%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Incompatibility and the pessimistic induction: a challenge for selective realism

Boge

2021

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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“…But other notions of inter-translatability are possible. 5 Another option is to assume that inter-translatability preserves incompatibility:…”

Section: ]mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, that this is part of what makes them theoretical rather than empirical in the first place. In this paper, I shall therefore assume (5). The underdetermination thesis under consideration will in effect be the following:…”

Section: ]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Realism and Empirical Equivalence

Johannesson

2019

J Philos Logic

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The main purpose of this paper is to investigate various notions of empirical equivalence in relation to the two main arguments for realism in the philosophy of science, namely the no-miracles argument and the indispensability argument. According to realism, one should believe in the existence of the theoretical entities (such as numbers and electrons) postulated by empirically adequate theories. According to the no-miracles argument, one should do so because truth is the the best explanation of empirical adequacy. According to the indispensability argument, one should do so because the theoretical terms employed in the formulation of an empirically adequate theory are practically indispensable for the formulation of its empirical content. The no-miracles argument might be refuted if one can establish an underdetermination thesis to the effect that every theory has empirically equivalent rivals that are incompatible with each other. Insofar as truth cannot explain the empirical adequacy of two incompatible theories, there is an obvious conflict between the underdetermination thesis and the no-miracles argument. I show that, under certain assumptions, some but not all notions of empirical equivalence support the underdetermination thesis. The indispensability argument might be refuted if one can establish a dispensability thesis to the effect that, for any theory with a practical formulation (e.g. for any axiomatizable theory), there is an empirically equivalent theory with a practical formulation in purely empirical terms. I show that (using axiomatizability as the measure of practicality) some but not all notions of empirical equivalence support this thesis.

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“…6 Grosso modo, o momento magnético é a medida de intensidade da fonte magnética de um corpo, como um imã, a Terra ou, no caso exemplificado, um elétron. 7 Dawid & Hartmann (2017) afirmam que Howson inaugurou uma nova linha de crítica ao AM ao atacar sua inferência e não, como vários autores fazem, cada uma de suas premissas. Esse, porém, não é o caso.…”

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O Argumento do Milagre comete a Falácia da Taxa-base? Apresentação, Estado da Arte e Questões de Formalização

Souza

2018

Intuitio

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The no miracles argument without the base rate fallacy

Cited by 14 publications

References 17 publications

Incompatibility and the pessimistic induction: a challenge for selective realism

Incompatibility and the pessimistic induction: a challenge for selective realism

Realism and Empirical Equivalence

O Argumento do Milagre comete a Falácia da Taxa-base? Apresentação, Estado da Arte e Questões de Formalização

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