“…A similar pattern can be found in the linguistic and philosophical literature on the logic of natural language negation (e.g., no). The standard approach has been to assume that its logic is classical (barring nonlogical uses such as rejecting the assertability of an utterance on grounds of, say, incorrect pronunciationsee Horn, 1989), leaving the opposition relation between an open class of pairs of opposed predicates (e.g., loving versus hating, happy versus unhappy, and so forth) to be handled at the level of nonlogical, emotive force (see, for example, Englebretsen, 1976Englebretsen, , 1981Englebretsen, , 1990Horn, 1989Horn, , 1990Sommers, 1970Sommers, , 1974Sommers, , 1976 for an alternative account see La Palme Reyes et al, 1994). The standard approach therefore also sidesteps the question of object structure and predicate inheritance (Sharpe, Eakin, Saragovi, & Macnamara, 1996), leaving it to be handled case by case, pragmatically rather than semantically (B. Gillon, personal communication, December 12, 1996).…”