The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance

Chee, Seungmin; Choi, Wonsuk; Shin, Jae Eun

doi:10.19030/jabr.v33i3.9935

Cited by 19 publications

(30 citation statements)

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“…This result is supported by Hariyanto and Utomo's (2018) research, which reports that executive compensation has a significant proportional impact concerning corporate tax avoidance because compensation with fantastic value will harmonize managers' and shareholders' thinking. Also, Chee et al (2017) stated that CEO tax avoidance strategy on high executive compensation is different from CEO tax avoidance strategy on low executive compensation. It is different from the research conducted by Putra, Andreas, and Nasrizal (2018), which states that there is no effect of executive compensation on corporate earnings management practices because executive compensation is only dominated by fixed compensation such as salaries and allowances.…”

Section: The Effect Of Executive Compensation On Tax Avoidancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This statement is reinforced by the results of Hansen, Lopez, and Reitenga (2016), which prove that there is a tax relationship with sufficient compensation. Research by Chee, Choi, and Shin (2017) states that executive compensation and tax avoidance have a positive relationship with low executive compensation but a negative relationship with high levels of executive compensation. Apart from that, Hariyanto and Utomo (2018); Rosidy and Nugroho (2019) state a negative influence between executive compensation and ETR.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Executive Compensation and Tax Avoidance of Banking Companies in Indonesia

Idzniah

Bernawati

2020

jasf

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Tax avoidance is the hottest issue in the last five years. It is reinforced with the Tax Amnesty Program by the Directorate General of Taxation (DJP), which began in June 2016. Therefore, this study aims to obtain empirical evidence of the influence of good corporate governance and executive compensation on corporate tax avoidance. This study used 215 banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for 2014-2018. This study using a purposive sampling method that produced 119 suitable samples. The analytical method used is multiple linear regression analysis through IBM SPSS Statistics 25 software. Computation of tax avoidance is proxied by computing of Effective Tax Rates (ETR). Good corporate governance is proxied by the size of the board of directors and the audit committee, and executive compensation is proxied by all director compensations. The size of the audit committee is a total of the audit committee in one period. The size of the board of directors is the total of the board committee in one period. This study used ROA and Leverage as a control variable. In this study, it was found that executive compensation and good corporate governance, which was proxied by the Size of the board of directors and the Size of the audit committee shown a positive effect on tax avoidance. Investors who do not want tax avoidance must pay attention to executive compensation and good corporate governance in the company. In contrast, control variables have not significant effect on tax avoidance.

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Section: The Effect Of Executive Compensation On Tax Avoidancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Executive Compensation and Tax Avoidance of Banking Companies in Indonesia

Idzniah

Bernawati

2020

jasf

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“…However, this research is in line with Uygur (2013) with the result that greater executive compensation can actually encourage accounting fraud. (Chee et al, 2017) also found evidence that greater executive compensation encourages greater fraud in corporate tax avoidance. (Bartenputra, 2016) that compensation does not affect the tendency of accounting fraud.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Uygur (2013) with the result that greater executive compensation can actually encourage accounting fraud. (Chee, Choi, & Shin, 2017) also found evidence that the greater executive compensation encourages the greater fraud in corporate tax avoidance. The existence of compensation contracts given to company executives can also negatively impact the policies taken by company executives.…”

Section: Literature Review Executive Compensationmentioning

confidence: 92%

The effect of compensation on accounting fraud with the genders variety of directors as a moderation variable

Indiraswari

Subroto²,

Subekti³

2020

IJRBS

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The purpose of this research is to empirically prove the effect of executive compensation on the accounting fraud and the influence of directors' gender in moderating the effect of executive compensation on accounting fraud. The sample of this study is obtained from a manufacturing sector public company listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The analysis technique uses multiple regression methods and moderated regression analysis (MRA). There are 394 observations of data obtained during 2016-2018 by using the purposive sampling method. The results of this study indicate that executive compensation has no effect on accounting fraud and the directors' gender does not moderate the effect of executive compensation on accounting fraud. The implication of this research theory shows that accounting fraud is not related to Positive Accounting Theory and Gender Socialization Theory. The practical implication of this research is that to prevent accounting fraud in companies, there is no need to pay attention to executive compensation and the directors' gender

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“…Previous studies have examined the effect of CEO characteristics on the tax aggressiveness level beside the capital structure choice and consequently on the shareholder's wealth beside stock crash risk (Neifar et.al. 2019;Chee et al, 2017;Chen et al, 2019;Huang, 2019;James, 2019). Furthermore, according to (Chancharat et al, 2012), the CEO characteristics have an essential role to mitigate firm risky failure.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of CEO Duality, Board Independence, Board Size and Financial Performance on Capital Structure using Corporate Tax Aggressiveness as a Moderator

Abd-Elmageed¹,

Megeid

2020

الفکر المحاسبى

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This research aims to examine how the Board of Director's characteristics (Board Duality, Board Independence and Board Size) and financial performance of the firm affect its capital structure using tax aggressiveness as a moderating variable. To the firm and the shareholders, taxes normally considered as an additional cost as it reduces the available cash flow, that's why firm's tends to apply different tax aggressiveness techniques in strategic tax planning to decrease tax liability and legitimate saving of taxes. The sample used is 58 Egyptian listed companies during the period 2015-2019. This research runs five multiple regression models to examine the relationships between research variables. The statistical results indicate that CEOD and board independence have a positive significant impact on company' capital structure, while board size have a significant negative relationship with capital structure. Moreover, results shows that ROA, current ratio and asset turn over have a negative significant impact on company' capital structure, while ROE have a significant positive relationship with capital structure. In addition, findings show that CEOD and firm size have a positive significant impact on company' tax aggressiveness, while board independence has a significant negative relationship with tax aggressiveness.

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The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance

Cited by 19 publications

References 0 publications

Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Executive Compensation and Tax Avoidance of Banking Companies in Indonesia

Board of Directors, Audit Committee, Executive Compensation and Tax Avoidance of Banking Companies in Indonesia

The effect of compensation on accounting fraud with the genders variety of directors as a moderation variable

Impact of CEO Duality, Board Independence, Board Size and Financial Performance on Capital Structure using Corporate Tax Aggressiveness as a Moderator

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