This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance.

This study examines the effect of macro‐economic shocks on asymmetric investor reactions to earnings announcements. Specifically, we focus on a small range around the earnings benchmark and find a disproportionately large market penalty for firms with small negative earnings surprises (ESs) following an increase in macro‐uncertainty. By contrast, we find no evidence of an asymmetric market reaction to firms with small negative ESs following a decrease in macro‐uncertainty. While prior empirical research failed to document the large penalty for small negative ESs, our findings suggest macro‐economic shocks as a factor that explains the asymmetric pricing effect.

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