The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification

Dewalque, Arnaud

doi:10.1057/9781137377920_11

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…30 One promising way of shedding light on what it means to be given, is to contrast mental states that exhibit phenomenology of givenness with mental states that do not. Dewalque (2015) has called this the compare-and-contrast strategy (Dewalque 2015, p. 185). 31 The implementation of such a strategy can also be found in the works of all the proponents of PCEJ we have discussed (cf.…”

Section: The Basic Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification

Berghofer

2018

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The aim of this paper is to shed light on and develop what I call a phenomenological conception of experiential justification (PCEJ). According to this phenomenological conception, certain experiences gain their justificatory force from their distinctive phenomenology. Such an approach closely connects epistemology and philosophy of mind and has recently been proposed by several authors, most notably by Elijah Chudnoff, Ole Koksvik, and James Pryor. At the present time, however, there is no work that contrasts these different versions of PCEJ. This paper not only bridges this gap, but also reveals problems in current versions of PCEJ. Consequently, I argue for a new version of PCEJ that focuses on what is given within experience and not on how what is given pushes me towards believing something.

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Section: The Basic Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%