The Oneness Hypothesis and Aesthetic Obligation

Chung, Julianne

doi:10.1111/phpr.12630

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…She examines existing accounts of such intimacy (e.g., Haapala 2006; Nguyen and Strohl 2019) before elaborating on her own conception. John Holliday (2018) focuses on the same phenomenon but then specifically in relation to fictional literature, while ideas of aesthetic attachments and obligations are explored further in the work of Nick Riggle (2015), Robbie Kubala (2018), Julianne Chung (2019). What it means to truly love a work of art-as opposed to merely judging it aesthetically pleasing or successful-and how such a love may have a lasting impact on one's life, is the subject of a number of recent publications (Levinson 2016;Cross 2017;Maes 2017;Shpall 2017Shpall , 2018; Schaubroeck and Maes 2021; see also Nehamas 2007).…”

Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 99%

Existential Aesthetics

Maes

2022

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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The aim of what I propose to call “existential aesthetics” is to investigate the various ways in which art and certain kinds of aesthetic practice or aesthetic experience can be of existential importance to people. Section I provides a definition of existential aesthetics, while Section II delineates this emerging field from cognate areas of research. Sections III and IV explore various subcategories and examples of existential aesthetics. Section V seeks to identify important avenues for future research and Section VI presents some concluding thoughts about the potential of existential aesthetics and why philosophers should be encouraged to fulfill this potential.

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Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 99%

Existential Aesthetics

Maes

2022

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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“…Views in this family differ with respect to the specific features of practical identity that are the source of obligations: Cross (2017a) points to the commitments one incurs in loving artworks, while Kubala (2018) points to the commitment one incurs in making self‐promises concerning aesthetic objects. Chung (2019) also discusses practical identity views and suggests a neo‐Confucian interpretation with a more expansive conception of the self as interconnected with other people, artifacts, and the natural world. One challenge for these views, in individualizing aesthetic obligations, is to account for how, if at all, one's practical identity ought to reflect the impersonal aesthetic value of objects.…”

Section: The Source Of Aesthetic Obligationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aesthetic obligations

Kubala

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Are there aesthetic obligations, and what would account for their binding force if so? I first develop a general, domain-neutral notion of obligation, then critically discuss six arguments offered for and against the existence of aesthetic obligations. The most serious challenge is that all aesthetic obligations are ultimately grounded in moral norms, and I survey the prospects for this challenge alongside three non-moral views about the source of aesthetic obligations: individual practical identity, social practices, and aesthetic value primitivism. I conclude by raising questions for further work in this area. 1 | INTRODUCTION "I must hear the new Lady Gaga album." "You have to play all the notes." "He shouldn't wear those colors together." "We ought to fund more arts programs." "The moral rights of the author have been asserted." 1 Can sentences like these express genuine normative requirements, or obligations? If so, what could account for their binding force? These are the two major questions about aesthetic obligations: whether there are any and what their source would be if so. Philosophers tend to have two motivations, broadly speaking, for asking these questions. One is defensive, aiming to resist the pervasiveness of the moral. Obligations, and normativity more generally, have historically been theorized primarily in the moral domain, and the fact that its commands seem to have such powerful force implicitly prioritizes morality on the theoretical agenda. If there are aesthetic obligations, then that would put the aesthetic domain on a par with morality, at least in that respect. But this is a dubious motivation, as it is increasingly recognized that-or at least seriously debated whether-obligations can arise in many non-moral normative domains, including etiquette, the law, prudence, and epistemology. 2 And it is in any case possible that moral obligations always defeat non-moral obligations. 3 A better, second motivation is therefore simply to explore the landscape internal to aesthetics as a normative domain, before attempting to make cross-domain comparisons. We might wonder: what kind of aesthetic life do we have most reason to live? 4 To what extent are aesthetic choices even governed by normative considerations? Do any of those considerations ever have the force of obligations? Asking whether there are any aesthetic obligations requires knowing about their alleged contents: what are these purported obligations of or to? One initial possibility to set aside is that aesthetic obligations are obligations of

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“…Lopes () provides an example from South Asian aesthetics, by reading Bhattacharyya's () rasa theory as a kind of hybrid view that answers the demarcation question in terms of aesthetic pleasure, but departs from hedonism by answering the normative question by appeal to the value of the freedom characteristic of such pleasure. Chung (, ) considers the picture of aesthetic value that emerges from a family of views in East Asian philosophy—views that emphasize the deep interconnectedness of individuals with others and with their natural surroundings. On this picture, the normativity of (some) aesthetic values is grounded in their capacity to engender awareness of how we are connected with aesthetic objects and, by extension, with things in general.…”

Section: Alternatives To Aesthetic Hedonismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aesthetic hedonism and its critics

Berg

2019

Philosophy Compass

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This essay surveys the main objections to aesthetic hedonism, the view that aesthetic value is reducible to the value of aesthetic pleasure or experience. Hedonism is the dominant view of aesthetic value, but a spate of recent criticisms has drawn its accuracy into question. I introduce some distinctions crucial to the criticisms, before using the bulk of the essay to identify and review six major lines of argument that hedonism's critics have employed against it. Whether or not these arguments suffice to refute hedonism decisively, I argue that its privileged status, as the sole contender in aesthetic value theory, is detrimental to downstream research on aesthetic phenomena. The essay concludes with an overview of current work and promising avenues of inquiry into non-hedonic alternatives.

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The Oneness Hypothesis and Aesthetic Obligation

Cited by 5 publications

References 6 publications

Existential Aesthetics

Existential Aesthetics

Aesthetic obligations

Aesthetic hedonism and its critics

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