The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence

Abstract

A number of comparative judicial scholars have argued that assertions of judicial authority are a function of the level of fragmentation/competition in the formal political sphere. Accordingly, in authoritarian or one-party settings, judges should be deferential to power holders, and in places where political power is divided between branches and/or parties, one would expect to see greater levels of judicial assertiveness. Through a longitudinal, qualitative analysis of one most-likely case (Chile) and one least-likely case (Franco-era Spain) and drawing on a half-dozen other cases from the comparative judicial literature, this article argues that political fragmentation is neither sufficient nor necessary for judges to challenge powerful actors. Instead, it argues that assertive or “positively independent” judicial behavior requires ideational support, in the form of a role conception/professional ideology that gives judges motivation for such behavior. Such professional attitudes are socially and institutionally constituted in a dynamic process that itself shapes judges' perceptions of the opportunities for and obstacles to judicial assertiveness, both within and outside the judiciary.

The Difference Law Makes: Domestic Atrocity Laws and Human Rights Prosecutions

“…Our findings suggest that, contrary to pessimistic assumptions, efforts by advocacy organizations to promote the adoption of national atrocity legislation are worthwhile, particularly in authoritarian states, where future transitional regimes could take advantage of these provisions for pursuing accountability for past abuses. These findings contribute to a new body of research on how legal institutions can condition human rights outcomes in ways that are independent of rationalist or sociological factors (Collins 2010;Hilbink 2012;Lake 2014;Michel & Sikkink 2013;Ocantos 2014). Contrary to rationalist approaches, our theory brings attention to the agency of prosecutors and judges in deciding how to anticipate or rule on legal challenges.…”

“…With these findings, we add to a body of new research arguing that the mobilization of legal institutions has been crucial for the push toward human rights enforcement worldwide (Hilbink 2012;Lake 2014;Michel & Sikkink 2013;Ocantos 2014). As we explain in the next section, the return to legal institutions as an explanatory factor serves as a counterweight to explanations that focus on either rational political elites or transnational socialization.…”

“…The assumption that human rights prosecutions result from strategic interactions between political elites in the executive and legislative branches implies that courts and litigators are secondary actors. However, recent research shows that lawyers are creative in their methods and judges behave strategically (Hilbink 2007;Moustafa 2007;Ocantos 2014). Theories explaining the rise of human rights prosecutions must account for the behavior of legal actors.…”

Human Rights Enforcement From Below: Private Actors and Prosecutorial Momentum in Latin America and Europe

“…This is not necessarily the case. Courts are, at a minimum, strategic actors in interaction with the executive (Helmke 2002), and, at a maximum, separate governing institutions with entirely distinct rules and interests (Hilbink 2012). Therefore, theories must account for why some courts produce certain outcomes and others do not.…”

Difusores y justicieros. Las instituciones judiciales en la política de derechos humanos

“…Entre los factores identificados por la política judicial se destacan: a)los cambios en la cultura jurídica, sobre todo los cambios en la ideología profesional (Hilbink, 2012); b)las estructuras de soporte legal en el ámbito de la sociedad civil, donde son ilustrativos los estudios de caso sobre Argentina, (Smulovitz, 2010), Chile (Collins, 2010), Uruguay (Dutrenit y Varela, 2010) o Perú (Laplante y Theidon, 2007); d)Los diseños institucionales que favorecen el acceso de las víctimas a la justicia (Michel y Sikkink, 2012); e) el incremento de la independencia judicial y el impacto de diferentes reformas judiciales (Skaar, 2011) y f) la fragmentación política o deferencia del poder ejecutivo en relación con los temas de justicia transicional (Couso, 2005;Burt, 2012). 11 Especial atención han merecido los tribunales ad hoc para la Ex Yugolasvia o Rwanda.…”