The Origins of Turkey’s “Heterodox” Transition to Neoliberalism: The Özal Decade and Beyond

Abstract

(1980-1989/1993) " was not primarily related to resolving the profitability crisis of the existing national bourgeoisie (Istanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie) or reconstituting class power in favor of this segment of capital. The Turkish neoliberal project was more concerned with establishing a stable political-economic environment that would help Turkey's political society reassert its hegemony over civil society and allow for the penetration of the changing interests of the world-hegemonic power in the region. Because of these social and geopolitical concerns, Turkey's neoliberal reforms (1) contributed to the development of an alternative/rival segment of national bourgeoisie which had the potential to co-opt radicalized Islamic movements, (2) aimed at creating a large middle class society (instead of shrinking it), (3) utilized populist attempts at redistribution to lower segments of society to co-opt the grievances and anger of the masses. As a paradoxical consequence of these dynamics, income inequality decreased during Turkey's transition to neoliberalism. Neoliberal reforms in the post-Özal period -with similar "heterodox" features -resurrected and further deepened during "the Erdoğan decade" (2002-present) although Erdoğan did not share a single aspect of Özal's professional career as a neoliberal technocrat.

Crisis of capitalism and cycles of right‐wing populism in contemporary Turkey: The making and unmaking of Erdoğanist hegemony

“…Likewise, as antisystemic movements were challenging U.S. hegemony, Kemalism was being simultaneously challenged by the gradual revival of the revolutionary left (brutally suppressed by the 1980 coup), the rise of the Kurdish movements and the strengthening of the radical Islamic movements, especially after the 1980s. U.S. world hegemony preferred a ruling bloc in Turkey that could co-opt these antisystemic movements (Karatas ¸lı, 2015). The Kemalist ideology, however, was not flexible enough to do this co-optation organically.…”

“…Together with neoliberal reforms, social assistance distributed by the state rose from 0.3% of the GDP in 2002 to 1.4% in 2014. Consequently, something unusual happened during the first decade of the AKP's neoliberal era: Income inequality and poverty rates decreased (see Figures 3 and 4; also see Özdemir, 2020;Bahçe & Köse, 2017;Karatas ¸lı, 2015;Tu gal, 2016).…”

The Impact of Kurdish Referendum on the Driving Forces of Turkish Foreign policy Toward KRG

“…These developments lead the PKK to announce for the ceasefire for the first time in 1993, this was a reaction by the group for the message of "Kurdish opening", and were hoping for a solution (Karatasli, 2015, p. 408). But unfortunately due to the sudden death of Ozal, all these attempts were suspended, and the Kurdish issue stayed as one of the top disputed issues in Turkey"s politics (Karatasli, 2015).…”

The AKP between populism and neoliberalism: lessons from pharmaceutical policy

“…4 (2015): 519–544; Şahan Savaş Karataşlı, “The Origins of Turkey’s ‘Heterodox’ Transition to Neoliberalism: The Özal Decade and Beyond,” Journal of World-Systems Research 21, no. 2 (2015): 387–416; and Cihan Tuğal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).…”