This article examines the global distribution of wealth within the capitalist world-economy over the longue durée. In stark contrast to the convergence of wealth predicted by modernization theory, the relatively stable bimodal (core-periphery) structure predicted by dependency theory, and the relatively stable trimodal (core-semiperiphery-periphery) structure, this article finds that the structure of the distribution of wealth in the world economy has transformed with each successive world hegemonic cycle. By adopting a longue durée perspective and a new statistical approach, I develop Arrighi and Drangel's (1986) method of conceptualizing, operationalizing, and measuring the global distribution of wealth within the capitalist world-economy. Through an examination of the period from 1500 to 2008, this article shows that the global distribution of wealth within the capitalist world-economy has transformed from a unimodal distribution during the period of Dutch hegemony to a bimodal distribution during the period of British hegemony, then to a trimodal distribution during the period of US hegemony, and now to a quadrimodal distribution in the early twenty-first century. While the global wealth hierarchy remained stable during periods of world hegemonies, it was transformed during periods of systemic crisis and hegemonic transition, thereby creating new forms of hierarchies.

(1980-1989/1993) " was not primarily related to resolving the profitability crisis of the existing national bourgeoisie (Istanbul-based industrial bourgeoisie) or reconstituting class power in favor of this segment of capital. The Turkish neoliberal project was more concerned with establishing a stable political-economic environment that would help Turkey's political society reassert its hegemony over civil society and allow for the penetration of the changing interests of the world-hegemonic power in the region. Because of these social and geopolitical concerns, Turkey's neoliberal reforms (1) contributed to the development of an alternative/rival segment of national bourgeoisie which had the potential to co-opt radicalized Islamic movements, (2) aimed at creating a large middle class society (instead of shrinking it), (3) utilized populist attempts at redistribution to lower segments of society to co-opt the grievances and anger of the masses. As a paradoxical consequence of these dynamics, income inequality decreased during Turkey's transition to neoliberalism. Neoliberal reforms in the post-Özal period -with similar "heterodox" features -resurrected and further deepened during "the Erdoğan decade" (2002-present) although Erdoğan did not share a single aspect of Özal's professional career as a neoliberal technocrat.

This paper analyses the right‐wing populist rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkey, focusing on the crisis of capitalism, emerging discontent in the rural populations, and opportunities for and obstacles to a successful left‐wing populist mobilisation. We put forward three arguments. First, through an examination of the historical evolution, class‐based and social‐demographic foundations of the ruling right‐wing populist alliance between the AKP and the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), we argue that the MHP is a more classical case of far‐right populism, whereas the AKP is a “heterodox” case that borrows several elements from the left. These “heterodox” features of the AKP, together with the interlinked crisis of the 1990s, played a significant part in the support the AKP received from the subordinate majority. Second, we argue that the success of the AKP's hegemonic right‐wing populism from 2002 to 2013 was linked to an unusually favourable macro‐political‐economic climate that helped the AKP counterbalance its neoliberal policies with pragmatic social assistance programmes. However, together with the disappearance of this macro‐political‐economic climate in the second decade of its rule (2013‐present), the disastrous consequences of the AKP's neoliberal policies became more explicit, and the AKP's populism moved from a hegemonic to an authoritarian right‐wing populist type. Third, we claim that today, due to the deepening of the current economic crisis (further exacerbated by the Covid19 pandemic), the AKP's cross‐class alliance began to break down, and the rural movements in the Turkish countryside have been playing a major role in unmaking the AKP's hegemony. However, in the absence of a strong left‐wing populist movement with a stronghold in the Turkish countryside, emergent possibilities for a radical progressive transformation are not utilised. Instead, the groundwork is being laid for another wave of right‐wing populism.

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There is debate in the literature regarding whether China can become a new world hegemonic power in the 21 st century. Most existing analyses focus on economic aspects of world hegemony-building processes and ignore its macro-political dimensions. This article starts with the premise that reshaping the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system is an important part of world hegemony-building processes. One of the ways in which previous and current world hegemonic powers established their world hegemonies was through the inclusion of new nations by co-opting, supporting or sometimes selectively leading a section of nationalist movements into independence. Our comparative analysis shows that, as of now, contemporary China has not been following this historical pattern. Compared to Mao-era China, which was perceived as a champion of national liberation-at least when colonial and semi-colonial areas were at stake-today's People's Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a champion of the global geo-political status quo. The current Chinese government is not actively pursuing the transformation of the inter-state system or seeking to create instabilities at different levels. This is because, unlike previous and current world hegemonic powers, during its rise to global preeminence, Chinese territorial integrity has been challenged due to rapid escalation of nationalist/secessionist movements within its own state boundaries. Hence, the PRC's foreign policy has consistently been concerned with creating and preserving macro-political stability at national and international levels.There is a major debate in the literature regarding whether China can become a new world hegemonic power in the 21 st century. 1 In this paper we provide a critical assessment of China's possible rise to global political-economic preeminence with a focus on macro-political dimensions of world hegemony building processes. Although there is a flourishing literature, which discusses limits and prospects of China's possible ascendancy (Ciccantell and Bunker 2004;Arrighi 2007;Jacques 2009; Lachmann 2010:202-206;Gulick 2011;Hung 2015), most existing analyses focus on economic aspects alone and ignore macro-political dimensions of world hegemony building processes.Our analysis stems from two premises: (1) Until now, efforts to reshape the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system have been an important part of world hegemony-building processes. (2) One of the ways in which previous and current hegemonic powers-the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States-transformed the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system was through the inclusion of new nations by supporting, co-opting, and sometimes leading selected nationalist movements into independence. We argue that by leading a select group of subject nations to independence, rising great powers enhanced their hegemonybuilding capacities by (1) gaining the "intellectual and moral leadership" (Gramsci [1971(Gramsci [ ] 2003 of these new states, (2) we...