The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor States vs. Major Powers

Abstract

Virtually all of the empirical work concerning the general impact of mutual military buildups on the escalation of militarized disputes to war addresses the impact of these buildups on major states. Given the fact that better data are available now than when many of the first studies were conducted, the empirical question of whether the escalation of disputes between major and minor states follows similar patterns is addressed here. This also avoids the problem of our assuming that major states reflect the whole system, without systematic evidence that indicates that such an assumption is valid. The study builds upon earlier work by looking at the consequences of military buildups for all Militarized Interstate Disputes, and examines the effects for different classes of disputes (those between major states, those between minor states, and mixed disputes). The findings indicate that we cannot simply generalize from major state experiences to minor state relations: there are clear patterns of escalation, and there are definite commonalities and distinct differences in these patterns. Mutual military buildups increase the chance of escalation for both major and minor state disputes, but not for mixed disputes. Territorial disputes are much more likely to escalate than other types of disputes under virtually all circumstances. And it appears that the period after World War II is truly different from previous eras. There is no pattern of escalation among major states, and the patterns of escalation in the two other classes of disputes are substantially altered after the war. The author argues that in order to explain both similarities and differences, it is necessary to refrain from placing theoretical approaches in direct opposition to each other. Rather, we must look at the interplay between objective threat, cognitive psychology, and the impact of constructivism on both our theory and practice in politics.

Identifying and Classifying Complex Interstate Wars

“…Thus, if a proto‐rivalry shows increased severity from the time period between disputes one through three, it is coded as an “escalatory rivalry.” If an enduring rivalry shows an increased severity level from the time period between dispute one and six, it is coded as an “escalatory rivalry.” We calculate the escalating tendency of a rivalry up through the phase of the rivalry in which a dyad goes to war. The arms race data is drawn from Sample (2002), who has compiled data on both major and minor states from 1816 through 1992. She measures arms races in two ways—one developed by Horn (1987) and one developed by Diehl (1983).…”

Decomposing the Relationship Between Contiguity and Militarized Conflict

“…These results are also consistent with the more specific literature highlighting the conflict-enhancing effect of arms races by neighbors. As arms races bring neighbors closer to parity, they are an important determinant of the gap in the conflict probability (Gibler, Rider, and Hutchison 2005;Sample 1998Sample , 2002. For example, in the sample of contiguous dyads, an average pair of states close to parity is approximately 100 times more likely to experience militarized conflict than is an average noncontiguous dyad that is also close to military parity.…”

The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models

“…Using a new dataset that includes minor and major powers, Sample (2002) finds that even minor powers get into arms races and the effect on the escalation to war is similar to the relationship between major powers and war. Sample notes, "We have been mistaken in simply assuming that major states represent the whole system."…”