This article examines the role of mutual military buildups in dispute escalation to war. It is argued that the effect of the pervasive realist culture in the modern state system is to affect policy choices and perceptions in ways that alter the dynamics of militarized disputes when the countries are arming, thus raising the chance that war will be the outcome of the dispute. Previous tests of the connection between arming and escalation have been fraught with methodological controversy and have been inconclusive in their conclusions. By contrast, this study is multivariate; it incorporates other factors that might have a strong influence on arming, escalation, or both. The findings indicate that when those factors are considered (including the issue in contention, history of disputes, and relative defense burdens as well as relative power balance), preceding mutual military buildups are strongly and positively related to the likelihood of dispute escalation.

The article seeks to resolve the debate in the empirical literature over the effect of arms races on dispute escalation. Until now, tests of this link have remained inconclusive due to the conduct of largely parallel, rather than integrative, research. Michael Wallace's 1979 study finding a strong link between arming and escalation suffered substantial criticism on grounds that both his index and his dispute sample were flawed. Utilizing the arms races measures offered by Diehl and Horn, this article delves into the conceptual, measurement, and sampling controversies that have made resolution before this impossible. The results of resetting the proposition indicate that regardless of the arms race measure or dispute set used, the relationship between arming and the escalation of disputes to war is positive and significant. Removal of controversial dyads from the World Wars does not alter the findings substantially (or in the assumed direction). By introducing a time lag, it is also shown that many of the disputes that both Wallace and Diehl designated as non-escalating arms races were between countries that were at war with each other within five years. Consequently, the conclusion is that arms races are strongly associated with the escalation of disputes to war.

Intercultural competence is an increasingly desired and necessary skill in a globalized world. While competence is a complex concept to define and assess, this study examines specific dimensions of the intercultural learning of students in the School of International Studies (SIS) at the University of the Pacific. Students undergo both an interdisciplinary, international curriculum and study abroad for at least a semester, taking courses on cultural adaptation before they leave and reenter. When they return from abroad, changes in their intercultural sensitivity are assessed through both direct (reflection papers and the reporting of “critical incidents”) and indirect methods (use of the Intercultural Development Inventory [IDI]). We find substantial advances in intercultural sensitivity for these students, which is largely consistent across assessment methods. On average, their IDI scores change by 19.78 points, which is both a significant change for these students and is significantly different from university students who have not been a part of the international curriculum or have not studied abroad.

Virtually all of the empirical work concerning the general impact of mutual military buildups on the escalation of militarized disputes to war addresses the impact of these buildups on major states. Given the fact that better data are available now than when many of the first studies were conducted, the empirical question of whether the escalation of disputes between major and minor states follows similar patterns is addressed here. This also avoids the problem of our assuming that major states reflect the whole system, without systematic evidence that indicates that such an assumption is valid. The study builds upon earlier work by looking at the consequences of military buildups for all Militarized Interstate Disputes, and examines the effects for different classes of disputes (those between major states, those between minor states, and mixed disputes). The findings indicate that we cannot simply generalize from major state experiences to minor state relations: there are clear patterns of escalation, and there are definite commonalities and distinct differences in these patterns. Mutual military buildups increase the chance of escalation for both major and minor state disputes, but not for mixed disputes. Territorial disputes are much more likely to escalate than other types of disputes under virtually all circumstances. And it appears that the period after World War II is truly different from previous eras. There is no pattern of escalation among major states, and the patterns of escalation in the two other classes of disputes are substantially altered after the war. The author argues that in order to explain both similarities and differences, it is necessary to refrain from placing theoretical approaches in direct opposition to each other. Rather, we must look at the interplay between objective threat, cognitive psychology, and the impact of constructivism on both our theory and practice in politics.

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