The paradox of joint culture

Fautua, David T.

doi:10.1037/e437862006-001

Cited by 2 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…15,16 None of these deployments, with the possible exception of the Gulf War, met the expectation of a "World War III." 17 Even the war on terrorism fails to meet those expectations, as no one knows what victory will look like or when it might occur.…”

Section: Call Out the Reserves: A Change In Paradigm For The Army's Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 Traditionally, Americans joined the RC in the belief that they would mobilize for "World War III," or other national emergency. 14 In the past decade the nature of war has changed, military operations other than war (MOOTW) have routinely necessitated the deployment of thousands of citizen-soldiers around the world for extended periods of time. 15,16 None of these deployments, with the possible exception of the Gulf War, met the expectation of a "World War III."…”

Section: Call Out the Reserves: A Change In Paradigm For The Army's Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The result of this experience exacerbated the lack of trust between the two components, in particular the AC and the ARNG. 36,37 The AC leaders believed that the train-up was an example of how the ARNG could not live up to its responsibilities, while ARNG officers accused the AC of changing the standards. This continued lack of trust casts a pall over the relationship between AC and RC leaders.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This continued lack of trust casts a pall over the relationship between AC and RC leaders. 38 After observing both AC and RC officers it is relatively apparent that many AC officers have a better understanding and higher level of acceptance of working in the joint operational arena than with "The Army." 39 Likewise, RC officers are so concerned about maintaining the relevance of their organization that they often try to force their component to be "more like the AC than the AC."…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This culminated with the 48 th Brigade's infamous rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) in 1991. 34 The rotation was ordered as part of the 48 th Brigade's post-mobilization training prior to deployment for the Gulf War, this despite the brigade's "passing marks" during a similar rotation only four months earlier. 35 In what became the longest training cycle ever conducted at the NTC, the 48 th became "certified" for deployment on 28 February 1991, 91 days after mobilization and one day after the ground war ended.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Call Out the Reserves: A Change in Paradigm for the Army's Reserve Components

Blakely¹

2003

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Section: Call Out the Reserves: A Change In Paradigm For The Army's Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Call Out the Reserves: A Change In Paradigm For The Army's Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Call Out the Reserves: A Change in Paradigm for the Army's Reserve Components

Blakely¹

2003

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Doing Things That Can't Be Done: Creating an New Defense Establishment

Keskel¹

2002

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Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for "Bush 41," and together they helped lead the United States and an international coalition to victory over Iraq during the Gulf War. Back in 1975-77, Rumsfeld served for President Ford as the youngest SECDEF ever, and was a successful CEO for several corporations prior to his second time as SECDEF. 1 Each one advocated a strong military, and together they had the knowledge, the experience, and the charm to implement a revolution in military affairs for the 21 st century. In his inaugural address, President Bush promised he would "build our defenses beyond challenge." 2 The hope of all in uniform was that the "Bush 43" team would restore the military to its heyday like their "prophet" Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s. Everyone began to spread the gospel according to Bush, including Bush. At the swearing-in ceremony for Rumsfeld, President Bush stated: "we will strengthen the bond of trust between the American people and those who wear our nation's uniforms. We will give then the tools they need and the respect they deserve…. we will begin creating the military of the future, one that takes full advantage of revolutionary new technologies." 3 At his first visit to a military base after becoming vi Commander-In-Chief, he said, "We will do better…I have great goals for our military, to advance its technology, to rethink its strategy." 4 However, not long thereafter, reality settled in and the word went out to the troops not to get their hopes up too high, not to expect any major build-up or budget increase, because it just was not the right time. Instead, SECDEF Rumsfeld's mission of producing the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), dubbed the "Rumsfeld Review," seemed to turn into a task to trim the military. Rumsfeld looked at major force structure cuts (like reducing two Army Divisions, one Navy carrier battle group, and one Air Force fighter wing), retiring the Air Force's B-1 bomber, and starting a new round of Base Realignment and Closure. 5 None of these came to pass. After seven months of exhaustive research and secret meetings, the SECDEF was forced to leave things basically status quo and let the services work some individual changes around the edges. Rumsfeld had previously suggested that rather than proposing cuts in the Defense Planning Guidance, he would leave it up to the various components of the department to determine whether and which cuts may be necessary to meet DPG goals. On Aug. 23, he offered some more detail on this process. He said the DPG will address components of DoD, requesting them to "come back with proposals that fit these constraints and these priorities with respect to the things we opined on in the guidance. With respect to the other things, come back with your best recommendations." 6 The current balance of power in Washington, D.C. makes it extremely difficult to implement significant change. Major change is often politically too hard to accomplish. As Thom Shanker of the New York Times puts it, "During the long summer of debate over...

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The paradox of joint culture

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Call Out the Reserves: A Change in Paradigm for the Army's Reserve Components

Call Out the Reserves: A Change in Paradigm for the Army's Reserve Components

Doing Things That Can't Be Done: Creating an New Defense Establishment

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