The Paris Agreement: Short-Term and Long-Term Effectiveness

Bang, Guri; Hovi, Jon; Skodvin, Tora

doi:10.17645/pag.v4i3.640

Cited by 73 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Barrett (, p. 76) predicts that the PA will more likely “change what players say than what they do.” Similarly, Falkner (, p. 1122) cautions that the historical record is not particularly encouraging when it comes to compliance with past ambitious targets for emissions reductions. And Bang, Hovi and Skodvin (, p. 210) conjectures that compliance will likely be the PA's “Achilles' heel.”…”

Section: Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work?

Dimitrov

Hovi

Sprinz

et al. 2019

WIREs Climate Change

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The 2015 Paris Agreement (PA) has been widely hailed as a diplomatic triumph and a breakthrough in global climate cooperation. However, it is commonly accepted that the PA's collective goal—keeping global warming “well below” 2°C above preindustrial levels—remains ambitious. Making matters even more challenging, in 2017, global CO2 emissions resumed growth after 3 years of near standstill. In 2018, this growth accelerated. It is therefore extremely important that the PA's institutional architecture meet expectations concerning its ability to induce member countries to promise and deliver emissions reductions. This study offers a review of the rapidly growing literature on the PA, to assess its strengths and weaknesses, its significance, and its prospects. We focus on evaluations of its institutional structure and its ability to induce member countries to implement policies. We frame the issues as a trilemma: the challenge of simultaneously satisfying all three main conditions for effectiveness—broad participation, deep commitments, and satisfactory compliance rates. Based on our review, we conclude that the key challenge for the PA will likely be to facilitate sufficiently fast ratcheting‐up of nationally determined contributions, while keeping compliance rates high. This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

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Section: Compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work?

Dimitrov

Hovi

Sprinz

et al. 2019

WIREs Climate Change

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“…Avtalens faktiske effektivitet avhenger nå selvsagt av til hvilken grad partenes lovede klimaplaner gjennomføres. Skeptikerne er mange, og de hevder gjerne at avtalen ikke frembringer de nødvendige incentiver for å hindre gratispassasjerer i implementeringsfasen (se for eksempel Bang, Hovi & Skodvin 2016;Barrett & Dannenberg 2016). På dette punktet kan for eksempel Kyotoprotokollen skimte med en innebygd sanksjonsmekanisme, som har blitt tilskrevet noe av avtalens suksess når det gjelder etterlevelse (Grubb 2016;Viñuales et al 2017).…”

Section: En Integrativ Vurdering Av Parisavtalens Effektivitetunclassified

“…Siden forhandlingene og signeringen av Kyotoprotokollen i 1997 har sentrale deler av litteraturen på klimaavtaler tatt håndhevelsesskolen rammeverk og forklaringslogikk som utgangspunkt, og deretter forsøkt å finne svar på hvilke mekanismer som kan vaere plausible og effektive for å sikre nødvendig ambisjon, deltakelse og etterlevelse (se for eksempel Aakre, Helland & Hovi 2014;Barrett 1999;Hovi et al 2012;Hovi, Skodvin & Aakre 2013;Mitchell 1994;Skodvin & Hovi 2015). Blant annet på grunn av en observert mangel på slike håndhevelsesmekanismer har denne litteraturen uttrykt pessimisme når det gjelder effektivitetsutsiktene til både FNs klimaforhandlinger generelt, og Parisavtalen spesielt (se Bang, Hovi & Skodvin 2016;Hovi, Skodvin & Aakre 2013;Skodvin & Hovi 2015).…”

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“…På den andre siden har litteraturen også uttrykt at bred deltakelse er sentralt for en klimaavtales effektivitet (Se for eksempel Bang, Hovi & Skodvin 2016;Hovi et al 2016;Keohane & Raustiala 2008;Stavins 2015). Gjennom klimaforhandlingenes levetid har det derfor vaert en konfliktlinje mellom to poler, både teoretisk og empirisk, om hva som er den riktige balansen mellom deltakelse og ambisjon.…”

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Håndhevelse og legitimitet: En integrativ vurdering av Parisavtalens effektivitet

Tørstad

2018

Internasjonal Politikk

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“…5 In as much as the agreement of Paris is under the international law there are certain provisions about it that lack sanctions and are not binding legally. For instance, some of these include determining the targets that are supposed to be set for the reduction of emissions 6 . Another one is how to achieve financial commitment to the countries that signed the pact.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How International Law Can Deal with Lack of Sanctions and Binding Targets in the Paris Agreement

Okonkwo¹

2017

JSD

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The Paris agreement aims at strengthening how the global community has responded to the change in climate by forming international government bodies that would be committed to reducing emissions to the environment. The lack of sanctions and binding targets in the Paris agreement has made its implementation difficult because countries live in an anarchical scenario where there is no overarching body. The agreement was drafted in November 2015 and signed on 22nd April 2016 by 196 countries but since then the success of the agreement has been in question. Generally, the treaty aims at controlling climate change and this is one of the areas that has been so difficult to control. Climate change is a tricky area to tackle because the developed countries are high pollutants because of the industries. The developed countries are mostly the ones who drive the agenda of the Paris treaty because they have the force and resources to do so. They influence policies and the decisions made. Therefore, the lack of sanctions and binding targets makes the treaty difficult to implement because there are no punishments as such. International treaties are difficult to implement especially when there are no sanctions or binding targets. As an example of international treaty governed by international law, it means that the treaty has loopholes that can be targeted by member states not to comply when the provision does not favour them. This paper critically analyzes how international law can deal with the lack of sanctions and binding targets in the Paris agreement as it operates in the international arena.

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The Paris Agreement: Short-Term and Long-Term Effectiveness

Cited by 73 publications

References 15 publications

Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work?

Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work?

Håndhevelse og legitimitet: En integrativ vurdering av Parisavtalens effektivitet

How International Law Can Deal with Lack of Sanctions and Binding Targets in the Paris Agreement

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