The Particularity of Visual Perception

Soteriou, Matthew

doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00107

Cited by 79 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…And, as we have seen above, this will be denied by the phenomenal particularist (Brewer, for instance is quite explicit about this -see his (2011), p. 98). Mehta recognises this, citing Soteriou (2000) in a footnote who notes that the challenge of explaining the perceptual indistinguishability of distinct but perceptually indistinguishable objects can be met by recognising that my experience of each twin makes me aware of precisely the same external properties. This is not enough, Mehta claims, because 'the challenge is to explain the sameness in phenomenal character of my experiences of [distinct but perceptually indistinguishable objects]' (fn.…”

Section: The Similarities Of Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to phenomenal particularism, particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. There has been a great deal of discussion of phenomenal particularism in the recent philosophy of perception literature (see, e.g., Soteriou (2000), Schellenberg (2010), Montague (2011)). Three common motivations are often given in support (Sturgeon 2008, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the particularity of experience

Gomes¹,

French

2015

Philos Stud

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Forthcoming, Philosophical Studies [accepted 2015]Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character.

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Section: The Similarities Of Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the particularity of experience

Gomes¹,

French

2015

Philos Stud

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“…In both types of cases, the object represented in the content of experience is not the object perceived. Following the literature, let us call the first scenarios cases of veridical misperceptions (SOTERIOU, 2000) and the second scenarios cases of veridical hallucinations (LEWIS, 1980). A simple case of misperception occurs when a subject perceives an object as having some property or properties that, in fact, it lacks.…”

Section: The Existentialist Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, in the last decade, the existentialist view on the content of visual experience has been questioned on several grounds. Soteriou (2000) claims that one must reject the existentialist view if one rejects the assumption that visual experiences represent a causal relation between an object and the experience itself and if one accepts the natural assumption-what he calls Searle's assumption-that the question of veridicality of experience cannot be settled independently of the question of whether an object is being perceived.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended

Pereira

2012

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resumo Este artigo apresenta um objetivo duplo: considerar detalhadamente as objeções contra a concepção existencialista do conteúdo da experiência visual e desenvolver e defender uma versão dela que evite tais objeções, solucionando, especificamente, o dito "problema da particularidade". A tese principal é de que o conteúdo existencial da experiência visual deve ser compreendido como relativizado, sendo conteúdo incompleto (em vez de um clássico, de proposições completas), modelado como uma função do sêxtuplo do objeto, agente, tempo, lugar, relação causal, e mundo para valores absolutos.palavras-chave Conteúdo existencial da percepção; conteúdo relativizado; problema da particularidade.

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“…It is important to emphasize that this objection fails to apply in the case of some versions of the representational view, including those versions that take perceptual content to be Russellian, gappy, singular, object-involving or singular-when-filled (see, e.g.,Soteriou 2000;Tye 2007;Schellenberg 2010). See alsoSect.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

Perceiving tropes

Nánay

2011

Erkenn

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There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view. According to this version of representationalism, the properties represented in perception are tropes-abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call this view 'trope representationalism'.

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The Particularity of Visual Perception

Cited by 79 publications

References 4 publications

On the particularity of experience

On the particularity of experience

The existentialist view (on the content of experience) defended

Perceiving tropes

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