The party system effects of unstable electoral rules in Latin America

Abstract

Prior studies have shown that electoral rules fail to determine the number of parties in new democracies due to the uncertainty of voters and politicians about which parties are viable. Latin American democracies, where electoral volatility has generally remained high and party institutionalization low, have been a primary example of this phenomenon. We argue that even in shifting political environments the fragmentation of the party system is likely to become consistent with the permissiveness of electoral rules and the level of social diversity as voters and party leaders accumulate experience with elections and the rate of electoral regime change declines. We find support for these propositions analyzing an original dataset on Latin American democratic elections. This article contributes to research on electoral systems and political parties by identifying the conditions under which equilibrium electoral outcomes can be expected after a transition to democracy in unstable institutional settings.

Democracy and Institutional Change in Times of Crises in Latin America

“…The more time elapses from the adoption of institutional mechanisms for voting abroad, the more effective these reforms will be. Even under unstable political environments that characterize the Latin American context, research finds that the effects of institutional rules such as electoral systems on party system fragmentation become predictable over (long) time as citizens and political elites accumulate experience with operating under such rules (Bunker and Negretto, 2023).…”